In re: John Moore, 955 F.3d 384

John Henry Moore was indicted on Hobbs Act robbery counts, a § 924(c) count, and a § 922(g) count; if convicted he might trigger the federal "three-strikes" statute and face mandatory life under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1).
The government filed a three-strikes notice citing three prior federal bank-robbery convictions, including a 1989 conviction that Judge Robert J. Conrad had prosecuted when he was an AUSA.
Moore moved for Judge Conrad's immediate, pre-trial recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455, arguing Conrad had personal knowledge of disputed facts and that his impartiality could reasonably be questioned because the 1989 conviction might be contested at sentencing under the safety-valve provision (§ 3559(c)(3)(A)).
Judge Conrad denied the motion, stating he had no present recollection of the 1989 case and that any recusal issue would arise only at sentencing if Moore were convicted.
Moore petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus directing recusal; the Fourth Circuit denied the petition, concluding mandamus was inappropriate because any disqualification grounds were speculative and not an indisputable right at this time.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 455 required Judge Conrad's immediate pre-trial recusal because he prosecuted Moore in 1989 and the facts of that prosecution might be disputed at sentencing	Moore: § 455(b)(1) and § 455(a) require recusal now because Conrad has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts and his impartiality could reasonably be questioned; partial/late recusal is insufficient	Government: § 455 does not require prophylactic pre-trial recusal where disqualification depends on contingent future events; recusal can be addressed at sentencing if and when relevant; mandamus is inappropriate	Court: Denied mandamus. No clear and indisputable right to immediate recusal because the need for disqualification is speculative and may never materialize; partial/conditional recusal at sentencing would be considered if necessary

United States v. Thompson, 554 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2009) (describing three-strikes law and sentencing determination of prior convictions)
United States v. Stone, 866 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2017) (abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing recusal denials on direct appeal)
In re Murphy-Brown, LLC, 907 F.3d 788 (4th Cir. 2018) (mandamus is an extraordinary remedy; prerequisites for writ)
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (high threshold for mandamus relief)
Murray v. Scott, 253 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2001) (recusal required for entire proceeding when conflict may arise later)
United States v. Feldman, 983 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting partial recusal under § 455)
Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636 (1st Cir. 2002) (permitting partial recusal as a case-management device in appropriate cases)
Pashaian v. Eccelston Properties, Ltd., 88 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting rule that any recusal must be total and immediate)
United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 1998) (approving partial recusal in bankruptcy context)