In re Joaquin C., B277434

Background

Mother Veronica C., diagnosed with psychosis/schizophrenia (paranoid type), gave birth to Joaquin C. (Jan 2016). DCFS received referrals about her paranoid/delusional behavior and prior loss of custody of older children to their father in Connecticut.
Multiple DCFS unannounced home visits (Feb–June 2016) consistently found Joaquin well cared for: appropriately clothed, groomed, bonded to mother, vaccinated, and developing age-appropriately; home was clean and family provided support.
Veronica engaged in therapy intermittently, initially resisted some services and a psychiatrist while breastfeeding, then began psychotropic medication after Joaquin was removed and breastfeeding ended.
DCFS filed a section 300(b) dependency petition alleging mother’s mental illness rendered her unable to provide regular care; juvenile court sustained the petition, detained Joaquin in foster care, and ordered requirements (medication, therapy, testing).
On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed: it held DCFS failed to prove by a preponderance that Veronica had ever failed to supervise/provide for Joaquin or was unable to provide regular care due to her mental illness; the jurisdictional and dispositional orders were reversed and petition dismissed.

Issues

Issue	DCFS (Plaintiff) Argument	Veronica / Joaquin (Defendant) Argument	Held
Whether substantial evidence supported jurisdiction under Welf. & Inst. Code §300(b)(1) (risk from parent’s mental illness)	Mother’s longstanding psychosis, history of noncompliance with services, therapist’s recommendation for psychiatric care and prior family history create a substantial risk to child	Evidence showed child was well cared for, bonded, had no injuries or unmet needs, and family support; diagnosis alone insufficient for jurisdiction	Reversed — insufficient evidence that mother failed to supervise/provide or that mental illness rendered her unable to provide regular care; jurisdiction not supported
Whether parent’s agreement to services or past noncompliance can be treated as admission of present incapacity	Mother’s prior refusal and failure to comply with VFM and services demonstrates ongoing risk	Acceptance of services is not an admission of inability to care; using willingness to participate as admission would chill service uptake	Rejected — court may not treat willingness to accept services as concession of incapacity; DCFS did not prove refusal to treat in a way that produced present risk
Whether mere diagnosis/historical delusions justify removal absent evidence of current danger	Diagnosis plus history and intermittent noncompliance justify detention to protect young infant	Diagnosis alone without conduct showing inability to care does not satisfy §300(b)(1) requirements	Held that diagnosis alone is insufficient; need evidence of failure to supervise/provide or substantial risk arising from inability to care
Standard of review and burden of proof on appeal	Substantial-evidence standard; juvenile court’s credibility findings entitled to deference	Same; appellant argues insufficiency of evidence to meet preponderance requirement	Court applied substantial-evidence review and found the record lacked substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional finding

Key Cases Cited

In re R.T., 3 Cal.5th 622 (Cal. 2017) (clarifies §300(b)(1) does not require parental blame; court must still find inability to provide required care)
In re Rocco M., 1 Cal.App.4th 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (traditional three-element framework for §300(b) — neglectful conduct, causation, serious harm or substantial risk)
In re Yolanda L., 7 Cal.App.5th 987 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (discusses substantial-evidence review in juvenile dependency appeals)
In re Nicholas B., 88 Cal.App.4th 1126 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (dependency jurisdiction is narrowly defined; reversal appropriate when evidence insufficient)
In re Jamie M., 134 Cal.App.3d 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (mental illness alone does not automatically render parent detrimental to child)
In re Matthew S., 41 Cal.App.4th 1311 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (reiterates that mental illness is not per se grounds for dependency jurisdiction)