In re Jenson
233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2018Background
- In 1979 Ronald Jenson (age 19) was convicted of first‑degree felony murder and sentenced to 25 years-to-life plus a 2‑year firearm enhancement; while incarcerated he later received three consecutive "Thompson" terms for in‑prison felonies (including a 5‑year term for a 1989 assault on an officer).
- Jenson committed his controlling offense as a youth (19) and thus was eligible for a youth‑offender parole hearing under Penal Code §3051; he had been crime‑free for ~27 years before the 2016 hearing.
- The Board of Parole Hearings found Jenson suitable for parole at a §3051 youth‑offender hearing in 2016, but CDCR refused release and recalculated his release to require service of the Thompson term under Penal Code §1170.1(c).
- Jenson petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus arguing §3051 (later, youth‑specific) supersedes §1170.1(c) (general rule for in‑prison consecutive terms); the Attorney General argued the statutes can be harmonized and both apply.
- The court concluded §3051 and §1170.1(c) are irreconcilable as applied to youth offenders who commit non‑life, non‑malice‑aforethought in‑prison crimes after age 26; as the later, specific statute, §3051 governs and entitles such inmates to immediate release if found suitable.
Issues
| Issue | Jenson's Argument | Attorney General's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §3051 or §1170.1(c) governs release when a youth‑offender (controlling offense <26) later commits an in‑prison felony as an adult | §3051 (later, youth‑specific) supersedes §1170.1(c); a §3051 grant of parole requires immediate release | The statutes can be harmonized; a parole grant on the controlling offense does not eliminate service of consecutive Thompson terms under §1170.1(c) | §3051 supersedes §1170.1(c) for youth offenders who commit in‑prison crimes that are not malice‑aforethought and not punishable by life; immediate release follows a §3051 suitability finding |
| Whether §3051 excludes in‑prison offenses from its consideration of the "controlling offense" | §3051 contemplates selection of the controlling offense from all sentencing courts and thus covers cases with in‑prison convictions | contends §3051 was not meant to override §1170.1(c) for adult in‑prison crimes | Court agrees with In re Trejo: "controlling offense" may be drawn from any sentencing court; §3051 applies despite in‑prison convictions unless subdivision (h) applies |
| Whether "release" in §3051 means release only from the controlling offense (leaving Thompson terms to be served) | "Release" means release from incarceration; §3051's purpose is a meaningful opportunity for release, so parole should result in actual release | Distinguishes parole on one count from continued custody to serve another consecutive term | Court interprets "release" as release from incarceration; a grant under §3051 requires actual release unless an explicit §3051(h) exclusion applies |
| Whether this interpretation rewards in‑prison criminality or undermines deterrence | §3051 does not create a free pass; in‑prison misconduct is a suitability factor and can prevent parole; §3051 merely provides the hearing and opportunity | Argues the result undermines §1170.1(c)'s deterrent purpose and permits circumvention of consecutive‑term policy | Court: deterrence remains via suitability analysis and §3051(h) carve‑outs; §1170.1(c) would otherwise double‑punish and is superseded for applicable youth offenders |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Trejo, 10 Cal.App.5th 972 (Cal. Ct. App.) (holds §3051 governs youth‑offender parole eligibility even when defendant has in‑prison convictions; §3051 supersedes §1170.1(c) as applied)
- People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (Cal. 2016) (discusses §3051 and §3046 effect on sentences for offenders who committed controlling offenses before age 26)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (juvenile sentencing doctrine: children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (Eighth Amendment prohibits LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders; concept underpinning "meaningful opportunity to obtain release")
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (U.S. 2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for juvenile offenders)