24 Cal.App.5th 266
Cal. Ct. App.2018Background
- Ronald E. Jenson committed first-degree felony murder in 1979 at age 19 and was sentenced to 25 years-to-life plus enhancements.
- While incarcerated he was convicted of three in-prison felonies (including a 1989 assault on a peace officer committed at age 29) and received consecutive "Thompson" terms under Penal Code §1170.1(c).
- After multiple parole hearings, the Board of Parole Hearings found Jenson suitable at a youth-offender parole hearing under Penal Code §3051 in 2016; CDCR nevertheless required him to serve the Thompson term and did not release him.
- Jenson petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus arguing §3051 (youth-offender parole) supersedes §1170.1(c) so he should be released immediately upon a suitability grant.
- The Court concluded §3051 and §1170.1(c) are irreconcilable as applied to youth offenders who commit in-prison felonies as adults (post-26), and because §3051 is later and more specific, it supersedes §1170.1(c); Jenson was ordered released effective September 9, 2016.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jenson) | Defendant's Argument (AG/CDCR) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §3051 or §1170.1(c) governs release when a youth-offender (controlling offense <26) later commits an in-prison felony as an adult | §3051, being later and specific to youth offenders, supersedes §1170.1(c); a parole grant under §3051 requires immediate release | The statutes can be harmonized; §1170.1(c) still requires serving Thompson terms even after a §3051 parole grant | Court held §3051 supersedes §1170.1(c) for youth offenders who commit in-prison non-life, non-malice-aforethought crimes after age 26; Jenson need not serve Thompson term |
| Whether §3051’s exclusions imply other in-prison crimes bar early release | Express exclusions in §3051(h) are limited; because Legislature specified only malice-aforethought or life sentences after 26, other in-prison crimes do not automatically bar release | Interpreting §3051 to allow immediate release undermines deterrence of in-prison crimes | Court relied on expressio unius and statutory purpose—§3051’s limited exceptions show Legislature did not intend to bar release for other in-prison crimes; parole suitability can consider misconduct |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Trejo, 10 Cal.App.5th 972 (Cal. Ct. App.) (held §3051 governs parole eligibility for youth offenders even where in-prison convictions exist and §1170.1(c) would otherwise delay release)
- In re Thompson, 172 Cal.App.3d 256 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (established that consecutive terms for in-prison felonies commence when inmate otherwise would have been released)
- People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (Cal. 2016) (recognized that §3051 and related provisions supersede some statutorily mandated sentences for youthful offenders)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (youthful offenders are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (life without parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses violates Eighth Amendment)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (U.S. 2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for crimes committed as juveniles)