525 P.3d 1057
Cal.2023Background
- Jasmine Jenkins was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for stabbing Brittneeh Williams; sentenced to 11 years.
- Postconviction, Jenkins filed a habeas petition alleging the prosecutor suppressed material Brady evidence: 2006 juvenile adjudications of the victim (Brittneeh) and a key witness (her sister Sade) for aggravated assaults.
- Jenkins submitted a Court of Appeal opinion (Emerald R.) and a newspaper article indicating the Williams sisters were involved; the Attorney General (AG) responded informally that the exhibit was an unverified internet printout and later filed a return questioning whether the adjudications even involved the Williams sisters.
- The Court of Appeal assumed, for argument’s sake, the adjudications involved the Williams sisters but denied relief on materiality grounds.
- The California Supreme Court granted review limited to whether the AG has duties to acknowledge or disclose Brady evidence in response to a habeas petition and held the AG has constitutional and ethical disclosure duties in specified circumstances; the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Attorney General has a constitutional Brady duty to disclose evidence in habeas when he knows or possesses evidence suppressed at trial | Jenkins: AG cannot constitutionally continue to suppress Brady evidence postconviction; must disclose upon verified petition | AG: No due process requirement to disclose at outset of habeas; Brady is a trial-focused rule and postconviction duties are limited | Held: Yes — when the AG has knowledge or actual/constructive possession of evidence suppressed at trial and material/exculpatory, Brady duty to disclose continues into habeas proceedings |
| Whether Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) imposes an ethical duty on the AG to disclose such evidence in habeas proceedings | Jenkins: Rule 3.8(d) forbids prosecutors from suppressing evidence and applies postconviction | AG: Rule 3.8(d) is pretrial-focused and should not impose independent duties beyond habeas procedure | Held: Yes — Rule 3.8(d) applies in postconviction habeas contexts and requires timely disclosure of evidence the AG knows or reasonably should know tends to negate guilt or mitigate the offense, consistent with statutory/confidentiality limits |
| What the respondent/AG must do in the informal response and the return stages of habeas procedure when a Brady claim is alleged | Jenkins: Mere filing of a habeas Brady petition should force AG to disclose; AG should not be allowed to sit on evidence during informal stage | AG: Informal response is discretionary; may neither confirm nor deny pending order to show cause | Held: Informal response may generally refrain from confirming existence of evidence, but if the AG actually knows/possesses the evidence he may not assert petitioner failed to produce documentary proof without explaining why he cannot confirm; after an order to show cause, the return must admit or deny factual allegations or explain inability to do so (per Duvall) |
| How to handle Brady material that is statutorily confidential (e.g., juvenile records under Welf. & Inst. Code §827) | Jenkins: AG should not be allowed to hide behind confidentiality to avoid disclosure | AG: Statutory confidentiality limits disclosure of juvenile records | Held: Confidentiality does not excuse the AG’s duties; AG may comply by notifying petitioner that records are protected, explaining the §827 petition procedure, and making any materials he possesses available for in camera juvenile-court review; respondent may plead inability to disclose in the return and direct petitioner to §827 process |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (establishes prosecutor’s constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory/impeachment evidence)
- Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (trial court in camera review can satisfy Brady when records are confidential)
- District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (distinguishing postconviction rights to newly discovered evidence from Brady obligations for evidence existing at trial)
- Steidl v. Fermon, 494 F.3d 623 (7th Cir.) (Brady duty to disclose continues into postconviction proceedings for evidence known at trial)
- Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567 (7th Cir.) (distinguishing Osborne and affirming ongoing Brady duties for evidence existing at trial)
- People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464 (procedural rules for habeas petitions: pleading burden, informal response, returns, and obligations when respondent lacks access to information)