In Re: Jeffrey Smith
829 F.3d 1276
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- Jeffrey Smith convicted of carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119) and using a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); one victim was killed.
- Smith filed applications for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, relying on Johnson v. United States and Welch v. United States.
- Johnson invalidated the ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague; Welch held Johnson retroactive on collateral review.
- Smith argues Johnson likewise invalidates § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause, so his § 924(c) conviction cannot stand unless the underlying carjacking qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A) (the force/elements clause).
- Eleventh Circuit assumed, for gatekeeping purposes, that Johnson could apply to § 924(c)’s residual clause but examined whether carjacking categorically satisfies the elements/force clause.
- Court relied on binding precedent (United States v. Moore) holding carjacking qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), and denied Smith’s application for authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Smith) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't / Court view) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson’s rule invalidates § 924(c)(3)(B) and thus permits a successive § 2255 attacking a § 924(c) conviction | Johnson’s invalidation of ACCA residual clause extends to § 924(c) residual clause, so Smith’s § 924(c) conviction is invalid | Even assuming Johnson applies to § 924(c), Smith’s underlying carjacking qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A) (force clause) | Denied authorization: Smith failed to make a prima facie showing because carjacking meets the force clause |
| Whether a petitioner must make a prima facie showing beyond citing Johnson to file a successive § 2255 | Smith contends Johnson citation suffices | Court: must show prima facie that the new rule applies to petitioner’s conviction (not just cite Johnson) | Court requires a prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within Johnson’s scope |
| Whether Moore’s holding that carjacking is a crime of violence is binding and dispositive post-Johnson | Smith argues Moore relied on the residual clause and thus may not control if residual clause invalid | Court: Moore clearly holds carjacking satisfies the elements/force clause and remains binding | Moore controls; carjacking meets § 924(c)(3)(A) |
| Whether complex categorical/divisibility analysis should be resolved at gatekeeping stage | Smith urges further merits analysis; raises ambiguity from statute language ("intimidation") | Court: gatekeeping requires only prima facie review; complex merits analysis inappropriate here | Declined to reach merits; prima facie showing lacking, so application denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (held Johnson retroactive on collateral review)
- United States v. Moore, 43 F.3d 568 (11th Cir. 1994) (carjacking satisfies § 924(c)(3)(A) force/elements clause)
- In re Rogers, 825 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016) (framework for gatekeeping review of successive § 2255 applications)
- In re Pinder, 824 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2016) (assumed for gatekeeping that Johnson might apply to § 924(c))
- Jordan v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 485 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining limited, threshold nature of prima facie determination)
- In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2003) (applicant must proffer detailed evidence to meet prima facie for successive relief)
- Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999) (interpretation of carjacking intent and elements)