In re Jackson, 51 A.3d 529

This DC Superior Court opinion consolidates two appeals challenging CPO enforcement in intrafamily offense cases and the procedures used for indirect criminal contempt.
Jackson case: trial court held a show-cause/contempt proceeding for CPO violations, but the government declined to prosecute and the court proceeded with the matter.
Rogers case: multiple contempt counts and aCPO petition led the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing sua sponte to adjudicate contempt.
Court held that trial judges may initiate and preside over indirect contempt but may not prosecute the contempt themselves; prosecutorial authority must be exercised by a disinterested prosecutor.
Court directs that prosecutors in such cases be the United States Attorney or the OAG, and only if both decline may the court appoint a disinterested private attorney.
Jackson’s remaining contempt conviction was reversed; Rogers’ convictions were vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with the ruling.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Can a trial judge prosecute indirect CPO contempt?	Jackson: trial judge acted as prosecutor; violates Robertson II/Shirley.	Rogers: same concern; court procedures in contempt proceedings improper.	No; judges may not prosecute indirect contempt; must use disinterested prosecutors.
Who may prosecute indirect CPO contempt in intrafamily cases?	Prosecutorial authority should be with government offices; privately retained counsel could be conflicted.	Trial court may appoint private counsel if government declines; need disinterested prosecutor.	First seek US Attorney or OAG; if both decline, may appoint disinterested private prosecutor.
What due process protections are required in indirect CPO contempt?	Lack of disinterested prosecutor and fair process jeopardize due process.	Defense counsel raised concerns about prosecutorial fairness and procedure.	Defendant rights require notice, a disinterested prosecutor, an impartial decision maker, counsel, and witness confrontation.
Is the evidence sufficient to sustain Jackson and Rogers’ convictions under the CPO?	Jackson violated enrollment in programs by failing to enroll in a designated treatment program.	RSC was an assessment facility; no enforced treatment program; leaving was not equivalent to noncompliance.	Jackson: insufficient evidence to convict on enrollment count; Rogers: evidence supported conviction, but convictions vacated and remanded for consistent procedures.

Robertson II, 19 A.3d 751 (D.C.2011) (reaffirms that criminal contempt in intrafamily cases may be brought in the name of the sovereign when appropriate)
Robertson I, 940 A.2d 1050 (D.C.2008) (authorized private-party enforcement of CPOs in intra-family contexts)
Shirley, 28 A.3d 506 (D.C.2011) (trial court may sua sponte hold hearings for contempt for CPO violations; consent defenses addressed but not controlling)
Adams v. Ferreira, 741 A.2d 1046 (D.C.1999) (court may hold evidentiary hearings to vindicate the court’s authority in contempt proceedings)
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787 (U.S.1987) (prosecution should be undertaken by a disinterested prosecutor; private prosecutors may raise conflicts)
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (U.S.1988) (appointing authorities and dispassionate prosecutions in executive functions)
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (U.S.1994) (contends that indirect contempts require careful due process alignment)
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (U.S.1925) (due process in contempt prosecutions emphasizes fair procedures)
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (U.S.1955) (fairness and appearance of justice in judicial proceedings)
Green v. Green, 642 A.2d 1275 (D.C.1994) (related to private enforcement of CPOs; context for private-action framework)