In re J.S.
121 A.3d 322
N.J.2015Background
- Two petitioners sought expungement after pleading guilty to multiple indictable offenses committed within a short period: J.S. (two drug distribution convictions five days apart) and G.P.B. (one conspiracy and three offers of gifts across two days).
- Trial courts granted expungement in both cases, treating the closely related offenses as a single "crime" (invoking the "one-night spree"/unitary-event concept).
- The Appellate Division reversed in each case, construing N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) to bar expungement when multiple crimes occurred on separate occasions even if close in time.
- The Supreme Court granted certification to resolve whether the statute’s phrase "has not been convicted of any prior or subsequent crime" allows expungement for multiple offenses committed in quick succession but not concurrently.
- The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division: under the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a), expungement is limited to a single "crime" and is barred if the petitioner was convicted of any prior or subsequent crime, even if offenses occurred close together in time.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) permits expungement when a petitioner pleads guilty to multiple related offenses committed in a short span (a "spree") | J.S.: the statute furthers rehabilitative purpose; "one-time offender" can include short-term sprees; Fontana supports treating closely related offenses as a single crime | State: statute’s "prior or subsequent crime" language plainly excludes multiple crimes regardless of temporal proximity | Held: Statute bars expungement when petitioner has convictions for multiple crimes; temporal proximity alone does not make separate crimes a single crime for § 2C:52-2(a) eligibility |
| Whether a conspiracy plus overt acts forming related offenses can be treated as a single crime for expungement eligibility | G.P.B.: conspiracy conviction and related overt acts are unitary; no prior/subsequent crime for purposes of § 2C:52-2(a) | State: each act/offer to different officials at different times constitutes distinct crimes; Ross supports denial | Held: Related but separate communications and acts are distinct crimes; expungement unavailable under § 2C:52-2(a) |
| Whether the Legislature’s 1979 and 2010 amendments changed the availability of expungement for short-term multi-offense sprees | Petitioners: legislative purpose and remedial nature counsel broader reading; absence of explicit rejection of Fontana suggests permissive view | State: 1979 wording change to "prior or subsequent crime" (versus "subsequent conviction") and unchanged language in 2010 indicate intent to restrict expungement to single crimes | Held: The 1979 change is significant and presumed deliberate; Legislature’s language limits expungement to a single crime and did not revive Fontana; if broader relief desired, Legislature may amend the statute |
| Whether courts should employ remedial/lenient construction to allow applications for expungement even if multiple counts were part of one judgment | Petitioners/dissent: remedial statute ambiguous; eligibility is threshold only and courts should allow applications to be considered on merits | Majority/State: plain statutory language controls; public-interest protections exist in other provisions but cannot override clear eligibility bar | Held: Majority applies plain-language construction; dissent urges liberal construction but court affirms restriction in § 2C:52-2(a) |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Fontana, 146 N.J. Super. 264 (App. Div. 1976) (applied "one-night spree" concept to treat multiple short-term offenses as a single conviction for expungement under the pre-1979 statute)
- In re Ross, 400 N.J. Super. 117 (App. Div. 2008) (construed current § 2C:52-2(a) to bar expungement when crimes were committed on separate occasions despite a single sentencing date)
- Kollman v. State, 210 N.J. 557 (2012) (discussed 2010 amendments expanding certain expungement paths and standards for public-interest prong)
- State v. A.N.J., 98 N.J. 421 (1985) (noted statutory shift to disqualify for another "crime" both retrospectively and prospectively; observed but did not foreclose the Fontana "one-night spree" view)