in Re J L M a Thompkins Minor
335674
| Mich. Ct. App. | Jul 13, 2017Background
- Juvenile termination appeal: father (respondent) appealed termination of his parental rights to his child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), (k)(ii), and (l).
- Proceedings: adjudicative and dispositional matters were addressed at the same hearing; trial court stated it would rule separately on each phase.
- Evidence: respondent was incarcerated, admitted criminality and prior termination of parental rights to another child (based on sexual abuse findings); trial court took judicial notice of prior appellate decision/orders.
- Hearsay dispute: respondent argued the court relied on hearsay at adjudication and at best-interests stage.
- Statutory finding: the trial court concluded at least one statutory ground (notably subsection (j)) was established by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the child’s best interests.
- Disposition: Court of Appeals affirmed the termination order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court improperly failed to separate adjudicative and dispositional phases | Petitioner maintained the court acted within procedure and informed it would rule separately on phases | Thompkins argued the court “skipped” the adjudicative phase and improperly merged phases | No error; court held phases were acknowledged and an adjudicative trial was held |
| Whether the court erred by assuming jurisdiction over the child | Petitioner argued statutory grounds for jurisdiction were proven by preponderance | Thompkins argued jurisdiction rested on hearsay and improper reliance on prior records | Jurisdiction proper; admissible evidence and judicial notice supported assumption of jurisdiction |
| Whether statutory grounds for termination were proved by clear and convincing evidence | Petitioner argued at least one ground (subsection (j)) was shown and justified termination | Thompkins argued anticipatory doctrine couldn’t be used and proof of future harm was insufficient | At least one ground (MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)) proved by clear and convincing evidence; termination permissible |
| Whether termination was in the child’s best interests | Petitioner argued permanency, stability, placement advantages, and respondent’s history supported termination | Thompkins argued court relied on hearsay and erred in weighing best interests | Best-interests finding affirmed: child’s need for permanency and respondent’s lack of bond/parenting ability supported termination |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Sanders, 495 Mich. 394 (controls requirement for adjudicative proof and trial rights) (discusses adjudicative phase and admissibility limits)
- In re AMAC, 269 Mich. App. 533 (discusses separation of adjudicative and dispositional phases)
- In re Trejo (Minors), 462 Mich. 341 (establishes that only one statutory ground need be proved to terminate parental rights)
- In re Gach, 315 Mich. App. 83 (addresses constitutionality of subsection (l))
- In re Olive/Metts (Minors), 297 Mich. App. 35 (provides factors for best-interests analysis)
- In re Mason, 486 Mich. 142 (discusses consideration of relative placement in best-interests analysis)