In re Interest of Zoie H., 304 Neb. 868

On Sept. 25, 2018, while the owner (Cuca) was fueling her 2012 Lexus RX350, two females entered the vehicle; Zoie sat in the driver’s seat and attempted to start the car while a friend urged her to leave.
An altercation occurred as Cuca tried to retrieve the keys; Cuca photographed Zoie, reported the incident, and police later interviewed Zoie, who admitted planning to take the car.
The State filed an amended supplemental petition alleging attempted theft by unlawful taking of property valued at $5,000 or more (a Class IIIA felony if committed by an adult).
Zoie moved to quash and demanded a jury trial, arguing that adjudication would expose her to prosecution under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1204.05 (prohibiting firearm possession by certain juveniles) and therefore transformed the juvenile adjudication into a “serious” criminal case entitling her to a jury.
The juvenile court denied the motion to quash and the jury demand, held an adjudication hearing where owner testimony and Kelley Blue Book–based testimony established the car’s value, and adjudicated Zoie under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(2).
On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court Zoie challenged (1) the denial of her motion to quash, (2) the denial of her jury demand, and (3) sufficiency of evidence regarding the vehicle’s value.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Zoie)	Held
1. Motion to quash based on § 28-1204.05	Challenge to a collateral statute is not a proper basis to quash the charging petition; standing limited to statutes relevant to prosecution	Adjudication should be quashed because it would subject her to an unconstitutional statute (§ 28-1204.05)	Overruled; defendant may not use motion to quash to mount a facial challenge to a collateral statute irrelevant to the charged offense
2. Right to jury trial	Juvenile adjudications are civil under parens patriae; § 28-1204.05 is a collateral future prohibition, not punishment, and § 43-279(1) requires bench adjudication	§ 28-1204.05 makes a juvenile adjudication produce severe collateral penalties, transforming it into a "serious" offense that triggers the constitutional right to a jury	Denied; § 28-1204.05 is not punishment for the adjudication and McKeiver/§ 43-279(1) mean no constitutional jury right in juvenile adjudications here
3. Sufficiency of evidence of value (≥ $5,000)	Owner testimony and officer Kelley Blue Book–based valuation suffice to prove value beyond a reasonable doubt	State failed to prove value of the Lexus met the $5,000 threshold	Affirmed; owner may testify to value and officer’s KBB-based testimony provided sufficient evidence of value

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury attaches for serious crimes)
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no constitutional right to jury trial in juvenile adjudication)
State v. Peters, 261 Neb. 416, 622 N.W.2d 918 (2001) (statutory firearm possession bar is collateral prohibition, not punishment for prior conviction)
DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968) (Nebraska treats juvenile proceedings as civil and adjudications without jury)
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile due process protections)
Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989) (distinguishing petty from serious offenses for jury-right purposes)
State v. Hibler, 302 Neb. 325, 923 N.W.2d 398 (2019) (motions to quash and waiver principles in criminal/juvenile context)
In re Interest of Laurance S., 274 Neb. 620, 742 N.W.2d 484 (2007) (juvenile proceedings are civil and aimed at rehabilitation)