05-15-00362-CV
Tex. App.Apr 20, 2015Background
- Relator Integras sought mandamus after the trial court vacated a default judgment entered November 17, 2014.
- Real party filed a verified Rule 306a(5) motion on March 4, 2015 (107 days after judgment) asserting he first learned of the judgment on February 23, 2015 (the 98th day).
- The motion sought to have post-trial and appellate deadlines run from the 90th day after judgment rather than from the 98th day he claimed to first learn of it.
- On March 19, 2015 the trial court granted the motion and vacated the default judgment—after the trial court’s 30‑day plenary power had already expired absent a timely Rule 306a showing.
- The court examined whether Rule 306a can restart plenary power when a party first learns of a judgment more than 90 days after it was signed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Rule 306a(5) motion filed after a party first learned of judgment beyond 90 days can revive the trial court’s plenary power | Rule 306a has no separate filing deadline; if its elements are met the court may entertain a motion up to 30 days after the 90th day | Rule 306a does not apply if the party learned of the judgment after 90 days; such late notice cannot trigger the 30‑day revival period | If notice or knowledge is acquired more than 90 days after signing, Rule 306a cannot extend the trial court’s plenary power; motion was untimely and court lacked jurisdiction to vacate judgment |
| Whether a verified Rule 306a(5) motion establishing first notice on day 98 suffices to invoke jurisdiction for an evidentiary hearing | The sworn motion established lack of notice and thus warranted reinstatement and an evidentiary hearing | Sworn statement showing first notice after day 90 cannot satisfy Rule 306a(4)’s jurisdictional requirements | A motion showing first notice on the 98th day fails to make a prima facie showing under Rule 306a(4); trial court order vacating judgment is void |
Key Cases Cited
- Mem'l Hosp. of Galveston County v. Gillis, 741 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. 1987) (Rule 306a jurisdictional requirements; trial court without jurisdiction when movant fails to establish entitlement)
- Levit v. Adams, 850 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1993) (Rule 306a does not allow notice received after the 90th day to trigger the 30‑day filing period)
- John v. Marshall Health Services, Inc., 58 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. 2001) (no separate outer deadline for filing a Rule 306a(5) motion beyond trial court's plenary power)
- In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. 2006) (Rule 306a requires filing before plenary power expires; Levit remains good law)
- Estate of Howley v. Haberman, 878 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. 1994) (motions based on notice after 90 days are not covered by Rule 306a)
- In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1998) (mandamus appropriate to correct trial court reinstatement entered after plenary power expired)