In re Ilasa, 3 Cal. App. 5th 489

William Ilasa, a second-strike inmate, was convicted (felon in possession of a firearm) and sentenced to a doubled determinate term; he became eligible for NVSS review after serving 50% of his sentence.
A three-judge federal court in the Coleman/Plata litigation ordered California to implement narrowly tailored population-reduction measures; the order (affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Plata) required creation of a parole-determination process for non-violent second-strikers.
California implemented the Non‑Violent, Non‑Sex‑Registrant, Second‑Strike (NVSS) Procedures (effective Jan. 1, 2015), establishing administrative review by a deputy commissioner to decide whether release "would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety."
The Board conducted NVSS review for Ilasa, denied release (finding he posed an unreasonable risk), and after reconsideration affirmed the denial using decision‑review criteria (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2042).
Ilasa sought habeas relief in superior court (denied) and then in the Court of Appeal, arguing the Board's denial violated his due process rights because the record contained "no evidence" of current dangerousness.
The Attorney General argued NVSS decisions are not subject to judicial review (no protected liberty interest) or, alternatively, that the Board's decision was supported by some evidence.

Issue	Ilasa's Argument	People/AG's Argument	Held
1. Is a Board denial under the NVSS administrative process subject to judicial review (separation of powers)?	NVSS denial implicates a liberty interest and thus is reviewable.	Separation of powers bars review because NVSS is executive discretion and not grounded in statute/regulation.	Reviewable: NVSS process created an enforceable liberty interest, so judicial review is permitted.
2. Do the NVSS Procedures (created pursuant to the federal three‑judge order) create a constitutionally protected liberty interest?	NVSS and the February 2014 three‑judge order created reasonable expectations of early release for eligible inmates.	No: NVSS are informal administrative guidelines, not statutes/regulations, so they create no protected expectation.	Yes: The NVSS Procedures (and the federal order and defendants’ agreements) created substantive limitations on discretion and a protected liberty interest.
3. Was Ilasa denied due process because the Board's decision had "no evidence" of current dangerousness?	The record lacks evidence that Ilasa would pose an unreasonable risk if released.	Alternatively, the record contains "some evidence" (commitment offense circumstances, prior violent convictions, weapons/ammunition, gang ties) supporting the denial.	Denial affirmed: applying the established "some evidence" standard, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the Board's finding of current unreasonable risk; no due process violation.

Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (U.S. 2011) (Supreme Court affirmed three‑judge court remedial order addressing prison overcrowding)
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. 2009) (three‑judge court found overcrowding caused constitutional violations and ordered population‑reduction remedies)
Rosenkrantz v. California, 29 Cal.4th 616 (Cal. 2002) (state due process places limits on Board parole discretion; factual basis for parole decisions is subject to limited judicial review)
Lawrence v. Texas, 44 Cal.4th 1181 (Cal. 2008) (indeterminately sentenced inmates have a due process liberty interest in parole; review for current dangerousness)
In re Prather, 50 Cal.4th 238 (Cal. 2010) (summarizing that the "some evidence" standard governs judicial review of parole decisions)
In re Shaputis, 53 Cal.4th 192 (Cal. 2011) ("some evidence" standard guards against arbitrary parole denials without usurping executive discretion)