In re Husain, 533 B.R. 658

Background

The United States Trustee brought disciplinary proceedings under Local Bankr. R. 9029-4B against attorney Al‑Haroon Husain for systematically altering dates, reusing debtor signatures, signing clients’ bankruptcy filings, and causing clients to sign incomplete documents.
Evidence from numerous consumer bankruptcy cases (Manavski I & II, Baig, Banu, Hussaini, Haider, Ibraheem, Ahmed, Rodriguez, among others) showed reused or photocopied signatures, altered dates on prior documents, and materially inaccurate schedules and statements of financial affairs.
Husain often blamed an employee (Marilyn Kaghan) or claimed client consent; the court found Kaghan not credible and held Husain responsible for conduct in his office and for knowing or recklessly disregarding the practices.
The court concluded that Husain’s practices violated Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1008 and 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (which require debtors’ personal verification under penalty of perjury) and ABA Model Rules (candor, honesty, and conduct prejudicial to administration of justice).
The court found recurring post‑notice misconduct (continued reuse of signatures after U.S. Trustee inquiries and judicial admonition), ordered disgorgement of fees to clients, reimbursement of U.S. Trustee costs, and permanently suspended Husain from practicing before the Bankruptcy Court for the N.D. of Illinois effective July 31, 2015.

Issues

Issue	U.S. Trustee's Argument	Husain's Argument	Held
Whether an attorney may sign or reuse clients’ signatures or alter dates on sworn bankruptcy filings	Such signing, photocopying, or altering violates Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1008 and 28 U.S.C. § 1746; clients cannot waive the legal requirement that declarations be personally subscribed	Claimed client consent; blamed employee Kaghan; asserted convenience/e‑signature practice	Attorney may not sign clients’ names, reuse photocopied signatures, or alter dates; clients’ consent does not excuse violation of Rule 1008 and § 1746
Whether Husain knowingly filed materially inaccurate schedules and failed to review filings with clients	Pattern of materially inaccurate schedules and reliance on reused documents shows willful ignorance and misrepresentation to the court	Often blamed clients’ limited recollection, claimed amendments would cure issues, and denied full knowledge	Court found Husain failed to adequately review/verify filings and filed materially inaccurate documents, prejudicing the administration of justice
Credibility and responsibility for office practices (Husain vs Kaghan)	Husain is responsible for misconduct in his office; Kaghan’s testimony unreliable	Claimed Kaghan acted without his knowledge and that clients authorized changes	Court found Kaghan not credible and held Husain responsible for the systematic misconduct occurring under his direction or control
Appropriate discipline and monetary remedies	Permanent suspension, disgorgement of fees paid in affected cases, and reimbursement of U.S. Trustee costs	Argued mitigation (client consent, corrective amendments) and challenged some factual assertions	Court ordered permanent suspension from practice before the Bankruptcy Court, disgorgement to clients, and costs reimbursement due to the gravity, persistence, and deceitful nature of conduct

Key Cases Cited

In re Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 2000) (bankruptcy court inherent authority and § 105(a) sanctioning power)
Matter of Volpert, 110 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing bankruptcy‑court authority to address attorney misconduct)
In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2009) (bankruptcy court sanctions and standards)
In re Hurford, 290 B.R. 299 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003) (attorney not permitted to sign client’s bankruptcy documents on client’s behalf)
In re Rivera, 342 B.R. 435 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006) (sanctioning attorney for filing certifications using on‑file signatures)
In re Nesom, 76 B.R. 101 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (suspension for forging debtor signatures on bankruptcy filings)
In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1970) (discipline’s purpose: protect public and courts; fitness to practice)