In re Hansen
227 Cal. App. 4th 906
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- In 1992 Michael Hansen was convicted of second degree murder and shooting at an inhabited dwelling; the jury also found he personally used a firearm. The Supreme Court previously affirmed his conviction in People v. Hansen (1994).
- At trial the jury was instructed on both implied-malice second degree murder and second degree felony-murder based on Penal Code § 246 (shooting at an inhabited dwelling); the verdict did not specify the theory underlying the murder conviction.
- In 2009 the California Supreme Court decided People v. Chun, holding that ‘‘assaultive’’ felonies (including § 246) merge with a resulting homicide and thus cannot serve as the predicate for second degree felony-murder, narrowing the scope of the felony‑murder doctrine.
- Hansen sought habeas relief after Chun, arguing the felony‑murder instruction at his trial was legally invalid and required reversal; the superior court granted relief and the People appealed.
- The Court of Appeal (majority) held Chun applies retroactively to convictions final on appeal, the felony‑murder instruction here was legally erroneous under Chun, and that error was prejudicial because the record permits a rational jury to have relied on felony‑murder (not implied malice); the court affirmed the habeas order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hansen) | Defendant's Argument (People/District Attorney) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retroactivity of Chun to convictions final on appeal | Chun narrows criminal liability and must be applied retroactively (federal and state precedents support retroactivity) | Finality and comity favor non‑retroactivity; tripartite reliance/fair‑administration concerns counsel against retroactive application | Chun applies retroactively under California law (court follows In re Lucero and tripartite test) |
| Applicable harmless‑error standard on collateral review | Chapman (beyond a reasonable doubt) applies because error affected an element of murder | More deferential standard (Watson or federal habeas standards) should govern collateral review | Chapman standard applied (court declines to adopt more deferential federal habeas standard here) |
| Prejudice from giving felony‑murder instruction (fact application) | The jury could have convicted based on felony‑murder without finding subjective implied malice; defendant testified he believed dwelling unoccupied | Circumstances and defendant’s statements compel implied malice; any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Error prejudicial: record permits rational juror to disbelieve implied malice; new trial required |
| Admissibility/use of post‑verdict juror questionnaires and declarations | Juror materials show jury relied on felony‑murder theory and support prejudice | Such juror materials are inadmissible to impeach verdict; trial court should not rely on them | Court did not rely on juror materials and held they are inadmissible under Evidence Code § 1150; decision rests on the trial record |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Chun, 45 Cal.4th 1172 (Cal. 2009) (held assaultive felonies such as § 246 merge with homicide; limited scope of second degree felony‑murder)
- People v. Hansen, 9 Cal.4th 300 (Cal. 1994) (original appeal affirming Hansen’s convictions; earlier held § 246 did not merge)
- In re Lucero, 200 Cal.App.4th 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (applied Chun retroactively to convictions final on appeal; used tripartite test)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (U.S. 2004) (federal rule: courts generally apply substantive changes narrowing criminal liability retroactively to final convictions)
- People v. Mutch, 4 Cal.3d 389 (Cal. 1971) (applied new statutory interpretation retroactively where decision clarified correct reading of a statute)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (U.S. 1993) (federal habeas harmless‑error standard: conviction should be overturned only if error had substantial and injurious effect)
- Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (U.S. 1946) (grave‑doubt standard for assessing whether error had substantial influence on verdict)