In re Hale, 535 B.R. 520

Debtor (John R. Hale) filed a Chapter 13 petition on March 16, 2015, after a prior Chapter 13 case was dismissed within the previous year; as a result 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) applies.
Unless a motion to extend the automatic stay under § 362(c)(3)(B) is filed and heard before the 30th day, the automatic stay terminates by operation of law on the 30th day after filing (here, April 15, 2015).
Debtor did not file or obtain a hearing on a § 362(c)(3)(B) motion before the 30-day expiration and therefore the stay expired as to the debtor on April 15, 2015.
Debtor moved (May 1, 2015) to re-impose the stay; the motion was unopposed but was filed after the statutory 30-day window and offered no other legal basis for reimposition.
The court denied the motion but raised and briefed a narrow statutory question: whether § 362(c)(3)(A)’s termination "with respect to the debtor" also terminates the stay as to property of the estate.
After briefing and a hearing, the court concluded that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay only as to the debtor and the debtor’s property, not as to property of the bankruptcy estate; actions against estate property remain stayed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the automatic stay may be extended or re-imposed after the § 362(c)(3)(A) statutory termination date when no timely § 362(c)(3)(B) motion was filed	Debtor sought reimposition despite failing to file/hear a § 362(c)(3)(B) motion within 30 days; argued stay should be re-imposed	Court (and statute) require a § 362(c)(3)(B) motion filed and heard before 30 days; absent that, stay terminates by operation of law	Denied re-imposition; stay will not be re-imposed because Debtor failed to comply with § 362(c)(3)(B) timing requirement
Whether § 362(c)(3)(A) termination "with respect to the debtor" also terminates the stay as to property of the bankruptcy estate	Debtor argued (in supplemental brief) that termination should not extend to estate property and sought clarification that estate property remains stayed	Creditors (implicitly) argued minority view that termination is total, removing stay as to estate property as well	Court adopted the majority view: termination applies only to the debtor and debtor’s property; the stay as to estate property survives

S.E.C. v. Wyly, 73 F. Supp. 3d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (discussing § 362(a) stay protecting estate property)
In re Witkowski, 523 B.R. 291 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2014) (holds § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates stay as to debtor and debtor’s property but not estate property)
In re Holcomb, 380 B.R. 813 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 2008) (same interpretation of § 362(c)(3)(A))
In re Jumpp, 356 B.R. 789 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2006) (majority view that stay does not terminate as to estate property)
In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (distinguishes acts against debtor, debtor’s property, and estate property under § 362)
In re Reswick, 446 B.R. 362 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2011) (minority view: § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay in its entirety)
In re Curry, 362 B.R. 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (adopts Reswick minority interpretation)
In re Jupiter, 344 B.R. 754 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) (minority view; emphasizes BAPCPA intent to deter serial filers)
In re McFeeley, 362 B.R. 121 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007) (joins majority view preserving stay as to estate property)
In re Rice, 392 B.R. 35 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006) (concludes § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates stay as to debtor but not estate property)