In re H.L.T.
549 S.W.3d 656
| Tex. App. | 2017Background
- The State sought civil commitment of Howard Lynn Thompson under Texas's Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act; a jury found him an SVP and the trial court entered a civil-commitment judgment.
- TDCJ retained Dr. Turner to assess Thompson (statutory psychopathy testing); Thompson did not fully cooperate, so Turner could not complete a psychopathy determination but noted psychopathic traits.
- The State’s testifying expert, psychiatrist Dr. Sheri Gaines, reviewed extensive collateral records, interviewed Thompson, and diagnosed pedophilic disorder and traits of antisocial personality/psychopathy.
- Dr. Gaines relied on Dr. Turner’s report, records of prior convictions and investigations (including multiple child-sex offenses and convictions), and Thompson’s limited admissions and behavior in treatment.
- Thompson appealed, raising four issues: (1) lack of jurisdiction because psychopathy testing under section 841.023 was not completed; (2) State’s expert failed to perform psychopathy testing; (3) legal insufficiency of evidence of behavioral abnormality; (4) factual insufficiency of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Thompson) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction re: §841.023 psychopathy testing | Trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed because TDCJ’s psychopathy testing was incomplete | Section 841.023’s clinical assessment requirement is not jurisdictional; referral/process may proceed without a completed psychopathy test | Court: Overrules — statute’s language does not make the assessment jurisdictional; court retained jurisdiction |
| Requirement for psychopathy testing at trial | State’s testifying expert was required to perform psychopathy testing; failure prejudiced Thompson | §841.061 entitles parties to examinations but does not specifically require psychopathy testing at trial; §841.023’s psychopathy testing applies only to TDCJ’s pre-referral assessment | Court: Overrules — no statutory requirement that trial expert must test for psychopathy in these circumstances |
| Legal sufficiency re: behavioral abnormality | Dr. Gaines’s opinions were conclusory/speculative and thus no evidence to prove behavioral abnormality beyond a reasonable doubt | Dr. Gaines relied on Turner’s report, collateral records, clinical interview, DSM-5 diagnoses, and observable risk factors; that basis supports her opinion | Court: Overrules — evidence, viewed in favor of verdict, supports a rational jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Factual sufficiency re: behavioral abnormality | Weight of Dr. Gaines’s testimony and record creates risk of injustice; verdict against weight of evidence | Jury credited Dr. Gaines; record contains corroborating facts, convictions, diagnoses, and risk-factor analysis | Court: Overrules — no factual-sufficiency injustice; verdict stands |
Key Cases Cited
- City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2009) (scientific or expert opinion without basis is merely conclusory and not probative)
- Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. 2004) (opinions must have a basis to be probative)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (standard for appellate review of legal sufficiency under a particular burden of proof)
- In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002) (burden of proof at trial affects appellate sufficiency review)
- In re United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2010) (when statute imposes a requirement but does not specify jurisdictional effect, courts presume Legislature did not make it jurisdictional)
- In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003) (definition of behavioral abnormality; effect on behavior control)
- In re Commitment of Mullens, 92 S.W.3d 881 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002) (legal-sufficiency standard in SVP commitment cases)
- In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011) (framework for factual-sufficiency review in SVP cases)