In Re: H.J., D.J., and A.J.-1, 16-0727

Background

DHHR filed abuse-and-neglect petitions (June 2014 onward) alleging petitioner A.J.-3 abused cocaine while caring for and breastfeeding infant A.J.-1 and had a history of CPS involvement including a prior involuntary termination in Tennessee.
Multiple drug screens between June–October 2014 were presumptive/positive for cocaine, methadone, cannabinoids, opiates, benzodiazepines; visitation was suspended after positive screens and inappropriate visit behavior.
Petitioner admitted at adjudication that untreated mental-health issues and substance abuse impaired her parenting; the court adjudicated the children neglected and later found aggravated circumstances based on the prior termination.
Petitioner repeatedly failed to submit to regular drug screens, tested positive when screened, was discharged from a recovery program for abnormal behavior and left without permission, and had recent criminal charges and a hospitalization for mental-health issues.
The circuit court denied petitioner’s requests for improvement periods and visitation (in part), and in June 2016 terminated her parental rights to H.J., D.J., and A.J.-1; siblings were placed in separate pre-adoptive foster homes.

Issues

Issue	Petitioner’s Argument	DHHR / Respondents’ Argument	Held
Whether evidence was insufficient to terminate parental rights because DHHR failed to prove petitioner breastfed A.J.-1 while using drugs	DHHR did not prove breastfeeding or that infant had drugs in her system; termination based on insufficient evidence	Aggravated-circumstance petitions and petitioner’s admissions about persistent substance abuse and mental-health issues render breastfeeding proof irrelevant	Affirmed: evidence supported adjudication/termination given admissions and aggravated circumstances
Whether circuit court impermissibly shifted burden of proof to petitioner	Court shifted burden to petitioner to prove fitness; improper under precedents that place burden on DHHR	Burden remained on DHHR to adjudicate/terminate; statutory law requires parent seeking an improvement period to prove by clear and convincing evidence likelihood of full participation	Affirmed: no improper shift; petitioner bore statutory burden to demonstrate entitlement to an improvement period
Whether denial of improvement period was error	Petitioner argued she should have been granted a post‑adjudicatory improvement period	Court relied on petitioner’s failure to show likelihood of full participation (statutory requirement) and her ongoing positive screens/behavioral issues	Affirmed: petitioner failed to meet statutory, clear-and-convincing showing required for improvement period
Whether procedural errors (e.g., voluntariness of admission) invalidated adjudication	Petitioner claimed she did not understand admissions and was under influence when admitting neglect	Court found petitioner familiar with proceedings, not under influence at admission, and later testimony corroborated admissions	Affirmed: trial court’s findings not clearly erroneous

Key Cases Cited

In re Cecil T., 228 W.Va. 89 (2011) (standard of review for circuit-court factual findings in abuse/neglect cases)
In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223 (1996) (same standard of review principles cited)
In Interest of S.C., 168 W.Va. 366 (1981) (DHHR must prove conditions by clear and convincing evidence but no particular mode of proof required)
In re Joseph A., 199 W.Va. 438 (1997) (statutory burden-of-proof discussion in abuse/neglect proceedings)
In re Kyiah P., 213 W.Va. 424 (2003) (aggravated-circumstances review when prior involuntary termination exists)
In the Matter of George Glen B., 205 W.Va. 435 (1999) (discussing reduced evidentiary threshold where statutory aggravated factors are present)
In re K.L., 233 W.Va. 547 (2014) (burden of proof remains with DHHR in abuse/neglect cases)