229 A.3d 446
Vt.2020Background
- In May 1993 Amy FitzGerald was murdered in Vermont. Gregory FitzGerald (petitioner) had been living in Texas and engaged in an elaborate travel/rental-car scheme around the time of the murder. He was convicted of first‑degree murder in 1994 and sentenced to life without parole; conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
- Key trial evidence included testimony from Denise O’Brien that FitzGerald recruited her to assist his plan, admissions by FitzGerald to relatives and acquaintances, evidence of scratches on FitzGerald after the killing, and FBI agent Wayne Oakes’s microscopic hair‑comparison testimony that hairs from Amy’s bathroom were “consistent with” FitzGerald’s hair.
- FitzGerald filed repeated PCR petitions raising numerous claims (ineffective assistance, prosecutorial misconduct, false evidence). In 2007 this Court remanded only three ineffective‑assistance claims (failure to investigate, prepare a defense, interview witnesses) for further factfinding.
- On remand the PCR court (Judge Pearson) found multiple deficiencies in trial counsel’s performance (including voir dire/opening statements, cross‑examination, failure to present a coherent theory), but concluded FitzGerald failed to prove prejudice and entered judgment for the State.
- Subsequent DOJ review (with Innocence Project) identified 1994 FBI hair‑comparison testimony as exceeding the limits of science; FitzGerald amended his PCR to allege the State knowingly presented false hair evidence and that counsel was ineffective for not challenging it. Judge Toor granted summary judgment to the State in 2019, holding FitzGerald could not show the State knew the hair testimony was false in 1994 and that any counsel error was not prejudicial.
- This appeal challenges both the December 2014 merits decision (no prejudice from counsel’s cumulative errors) and the April 2019 summary‑judgment ruling (no knowing use of false evidence and no prejudice from failing to challenge hair testimony). The Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | FitzGerald's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial counsel’s cumulative errors (voir dire/opening, cross‑examination, failure to present coherent defense) were prejudicial under Strickland | Counsel’s multiple deficiencies, viewed cumulatively, created a reasonable probability of a different outcome | Evidence of guilt was overwhelming; any counsel errors were not reasonably likely to affect the verdict | No prejudice; PCR court’s finding affirmed (counsel may have been deficient but defendant failed to show reasonable probability of different result) |
| Whether the State knowingly presented false or misleading FBI hair‑comparison evidence (due‑process/Brady‑type claim) | DOJ review shows Agent Oakes’s 1994 testimony exceeded scientific limits; State should be charged with that knowledge | No evidence prosecutors or Agent Oakes knew the testimony was false in 1994; seminal criticism post‑dated trial (e.g., NAS 2009) | FitzGerald failed to show the State knew the hair testimony was false in 1994; summary judgment for State affirmed |
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the hair‑comparison testimony | Counsel should have challenged the flawed science; failure to do so prejudiced FitzGerald by conceding presence of his hair | Even if counsel erred, other evidence (confessions, travel scheme, injuries, lies) and FitzGerald’s own statements provided innocent explanations for the hair; no reasonable probability of different result | No prejudice shown; PCR court correctly concluded lack of prejudice and affirmed summary judgment |
| Whether the plea‑offer claim could be revisited on remand (scope/law‑of‑the‑case) | Plea offer was part of counsel’s failure to prepare a defense and should be considered on remand | 2007 remand limited review to three specified claims; plea‑offer was a separate claim and thus outside remit | Plea offer claim was outside the 2007 remand scope under law‑of‑the‑case and was not addressed on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part ineffective‑assistance standard: deficiency and prejudice)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of material, favorable evidence by prosecution violates due process)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (prosecutor’s duty to learn of favorable evidence known to others acting on the government’s behalf)
- United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (standard for use of perjured/false evidence and materiality analysis)
- In re Towne, 86 A.3d 429 (Vt. 2013) (consider all evidence when evaluating prejudice in PCR context)
- In re Combs, 27 A.3d 318 (Vt. 2011) (Vermont standard for ineffective assistance; need for expert testimony to establish deficiency)
- State v. Briggs, 568 A.2d 779 (Vt. 1989) (false‑evidence/knowing use standard under Vermont law)