In re Grant on Discipline, 58 Cal. 4th 469

Gary D. Grant, admitted 1994, pleaded guilty in 2009 to one felony count of knowingly possessing child pornography (Pen. Code § 311.11(a)); sentenced to probation, jail time, and lifetime sex-offender registration.
The State Bar transmitted Grant’s conviction to the Review Department; Chief Trial Counsel sought summary disbarment under Bus. & Prof. Code § 6102(c) arguing possession of child pornography involves moral turpitude per se.
The Review Department declined summary disbarment, held the crime “may or may not” involve moral turpitude, and referred the matter for a hearing; the hearing judge found moral turpitude and recommended disbarment.
The Review Department later reversed the hearing judge on evidentiary grounds and recommended probation with a two-year actual suspension.
Chief Trial Counsel petitioned for review to decide whether § 311.11(a) involves moral turpitude in every case; the Supreme Court considered statutory elements, policy, and precedent and treated Grant’s guilty plea as establishing the elements.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether knowing possession or control of child pornography under § 311.11(a) is a crime involving moral turpitude per se	Chief Trial Counsel: Yes — the crime is inherently repugnant and linked to sexual abuse of children, so it involves moral turpitude in every case	Grant: No — simple possession may lack intent to harm or corrupt (e.g., unsolicited or fleeting images), so it does not necessarily evidence bad moral character	Held: Yes — knowing possession/control of child pornography involves moral turpitude per se for attorney-discipline purposes
Whether hypothetical scenarios (images near age of majority; unsolicited fleeting receipt immediately deleted) prevent categorical moral-turpitude classification	Plaintiff: categorical rule still justified by legislative intent, harms from possession, and public protection concerns	Defendant: such scenarios show conviction may occur without moral culpability; review should consider facts	Held: Hypotheticals do not undermine categorical rule; momentary/innocent possession defenses remain available in criminal proceedings but do not prevent categorical disciplinary classification

In re Lesansky, 25 Cal.4th 11 (defines moral turpitude standard for attorney discipline)
In re Alva, 33 Cal.4th 254 (elements of § 311.11(a) explained)
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (discusses harms and First Amendment limits regarding child pornography)
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (recognition of child pornography’s relation to child sexual abuse)
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (consumer possession linked to production and child harm)
U.S. v. Santacruz, 563 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. holding possession of child pornography is a crime of moral turpitude)
Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. describing knowing possession as categorically a crime of moral turpitude)
Tecklenburg v. Appellate Division, 169 Cal.App.4th 1402 (distinguished — addressed temporary Internet files and did not support a rule excusing fleeting unsolicited receipt)