In Re Grand Jury Proceeding of John Doe, 82 N.E.3d 1115

State issued eight grand-jury subpoenas to individuals associated with appellants (an Ohio limited partnership and the president of its general partner); subpoenas sought documents and testimony claimed to be privileged.
Appellants moved to quash, asserting attorney-client privilege, work-product, and common-interest protections; trial court denied the motions, concluding the material was not privileged.
Appellants appealed to the Eighth District, which sua sponte questioned appealability and concluded the trial-court order was not a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02; it certified a conflict with Fourth and Tenth District decisions.
This Court accepted the conflict and consolidated the appeals to decide whether an order denying a motion to quash a grand-jury subpoena and compelling production/testimony is a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4).
The Supreme Court analyzed whether grand-jury proceedings qualify as an "action" for purposes of R.C. 2505.02 and whether a motion to quash is a provisional remedy ancillary to that action.
The Court reversed the Eighth District: it held grand-jury proceedings are "actions" for this purpose and that an order enforcing a grand-jury subpoena to produce allegedly privileged information is a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an order denying a motion to quash a grand-jury subpoena compelling production/testimony of allegedly privileged material is a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)	Appellants: such an order is final and appealable because producing privileged material destroys the right and cannot be remedied later.	State (and Eighth Dist. position): Eighth Dist. argued grand-jury proceedings are not "actions" under R.C. 2505.02, so the order is not a provisional remedy subject to immediate appeal.	Held: Yes. The order is a provisional remedy that satisfies both prongs of R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) and is final and appealable.
Whether grand-jury proceedings constitute an "action" for purposes of R.C. 2505.02	Appellants: grand-jury proceedings are ordinary court proceedings that function as actions for this purpose.	Eighth Dist.: Relied on R.C. 2307.01 definition (civil-focused) to say grand-jury proceedings are investigatory and not "actions."	Held: Grand-jury proceedings qualify as "actions" under the broader jurisprudential definition (Bernbaum), so the provisional-remedy framework applies.

United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (U.S. 1974) (grand jury subpoena power is not unlimited; grand jury may not itself violate valid privileges)
Bernbaum v. Silverstein, 62 Ohio St.2d 445 (Ohio 1980) (distinguishing "action" from "special proceeding"; defining scope of action)
Polikoff v. Adam, 67 Ohio St.3d 100 (Ohio 1993) (orders in actions recognized at common law are not "special proceedings" under R.C. 2505.02)
In re Grand Jury, 76 Ohio St.3d 236 (Ohio 1996) (grand-jury proceedings are not special proceedings despite codification)
State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d 440 (Ohio 2001) (defines "ancillary proceeding" as attendant upon or aiding another proceeding for R.C. 2505.02(A)(3))
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (U.S. 1947) (development of work-product concepts; protections for documents prepared for litigation)
Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1 (Ohio 1906) (recognition of privilege for reports prepared in anticipation of litigation)
Smith v. Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411 (Ohio 2015) (procedural-privilege rulings referenced in concurring critique)
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216 (Ohio 2003) (tripartite test for overruling precedent referenced in concurrence)