In Re Grace N.
M2016-00453-COA-R3-JV
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Sep 8, 2017Background
- Parents (Mother Rachel N. and Father Julian G.) are disputing custody/parenting time and child support for their daughter Grace, born 2010; this is the second appeal following partial reversal/remand by the Court of Appeals.
- First appeal: this Court found Father’s parenting time below the Child Support Guidelines’ presumption (≈68 days vs. 80-day presumption) and remanded to increase Father’s parenting time; also remanded issues regarding (1) Father’s income from a jointly‑titled rental property (Fatherland Property), (2) valuation of barter income for attorney fees, and (3) a new hearing on Mother’s work-related childcare expenses and underemployment.
- On remand the trial court (Judge Calloway): increased Father’s parenting time to 120 days/year (retained Mother as primary residential parent and sole decision-maker), recalculated child support, imputed barter income of $2,925 to Father (2014), imputed $2,700 from the Fatherland sale (2014), imputed significant earning capacity to Mother back to 2010, reduced Mother’s childcare credit to $550/month and denied childcare credit after August 2015, and ordered Father to provide health insurance with unequal sharing of uncovered medical costs (63% Mother / 37% Father).
- Mother appealed arguing the trial court exceeded remand scope (re-deciding custody/decision-maker and health insurance), erred in several income imputations and exclusions (Father’s income items and Mother’s underemployment period), and misapplied the Guidelines on childcare and fringe benefits.
- This Court: affirmed the parenting schedule as within the child’s best interest, but reversed or vacated several child-support determinations and remanded for recalculation consistent with the opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mother) | Defendant's Argument (Father) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court exceeded remand by revisiting primary residential parent/decision-maker and making new best‑interest findings | Remand was limited to increasing parenting days and child‑support matters; trial court impermissibly revisited custody/major decision allocation and made contradictory best‑interest findings | Trial court reviewed whole record and properly fashioned parenting schedule to give Father increased time | Court: Trial court should not have altered unchallenged prior factual findings when it relied solely on the existing record, but the parenting schedule itself is affirmed as in child’s best interest |
| Father’s income from Fatherland Property (2014 sale/rental) | Trial court should not impute more than Father actually received; earlier presumption of 50% ownership was rebutted | Father limited his interest to a share of profit; trial court found $2,700 received at closing | Court: Affirmed trial court’s imputation of $2,700 for 2014 from the sale |
| Value of barter income (home repairs for attorney credited against fees) | Trial court previously erred by attributing full legal-bill value; remand should value only services actually rendered | On remand evidence supported $2,925 valuation and 1099/MISC documentation | Court: Affirmed the $2,925 barter income imputation |
| Whether remand allowed reworking Father’s prior “base income” (2010–2013) beyond the two remanded items | Mother: Remand limited to Fatherland and barter issues; earlier base-income findings should stand | Father: Remand permitted reconsideration of his entire income picture | Held: Remand only allowed reconsideration of the two specified income errors; prior base-income findings for 2010–2013 are to be reinstated (trial court’s broader recalculation reversed) |
| Mother’s underemployment and imputed earnings (2010 onward) | Mother: Underemployment challenge in prior appeal concerned only 2013; trial court had no authority to impute income before 2013; also disputes voluntariness and reliance on court’s independent research | Father: Mother voluntarily reduced work; trial court reasonably imputed earning capacity | Held: Trial court erred imputing income to Mother for years prior to 2013 (waived issue); otherwise trial court’s factual finding of voluntary underemployment (2013+) is affirmed and imputation amounts largely upheld |
| Work-related childcare credit and summer care (2010–2015 and after) | Mother: childcare costs were work‑related and should be credited, including summer 2015 and after kindergarten started | Father: Many claimed childcare expenses were excessive or not work‑related; after kindergarten no childcare needed | Held: Trial court reasonably limited childcare credit to $550/month for much of the period (credit corresponds to 3-day daycare); but erred in denying any credit after August 2015—Mother should get credit for documented summer childcare (annualized) |
| Exclusion of small income items (musician profit, employer cell-phone fringe) | Mother: All income under Guidelines must be counted; these items should not be ignored | Father: Items are de minimis and IRS guidance supports ignoring cell-phone fringe | Held: Court requires these items be considered on remand (Guidelines define gross income broadly; fringe benefits count if they reduce personal expenses) |
| Health insurance and allocation of out‑of‑pocket medical expenses on remand | Mother: Trial court exceeded remand scope by changing insurance provider and allocation; prior order had Mother providing insurance and equal sharing | Father: Trial court reallocated based on current circumstances | Held: Court vacated trial court’s change on remand and reinstated prior determination (Mother to provide insurance and prior allocation of medical costs) |
Key Cases Cited
- Northland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 916 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (standard for de novo review of facts with presumption of correctness)
- Davis v. Davis, 223 S.W.3d 233 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (legal conclusions receive no deference on appeal)
- Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515 (Tenn. 2010) (abuse of discretion standard for discretionary rulings)
- Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (scope of appellate review under abuse of discretion)
- Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82 (Tenn. 2001) (appellate courts should not "tweak" parenting schedules)
- Willis v. Willis, 62 S.W.3d 735 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (standards for willful and voluntary underemployment in child‑support context)
- Burlew v. Burlew, 40 S.W.3d 465 (Tenn. 2001) (trial courts free to define custody terms and allocate parental responsibilities)