949 F.3d 1338
Fed. Cir.2020Background
- Super Interconnect Technologies (SIT) sued Google in the Eastern District of Texas for patent infringement, alleging venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) based on Google Global Cache (GGC) servers physically located in the district.
- The GGC servers were owned by Google but installed and hosted inside Internet Service Providers’ (ISPs’) datacenters (Cable One and Suddenlink) under contracts that provided rack space, power, IP addresses, network access, installation, and limited remote maintenance.
- Contracts restricted ISP movement or unauthorized access to the servers; no Google employees physically installed, maintained, or accessed those servers in the district.
- The district court denied Google’s motion to dismiss for improper venue, relying on its prior SEVEN Networks decision; Google sought mandamus to compel dismissal or transfer.
- The Federal Circuit applied the Cray three-part test for a “regular and established place of business,” evaluated agency principles, and concluded venue in E.D. Tex. was improper because no Google employee or agent was regularly conducting Google’s business at the alleged place.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does rack/shelf/rack-space housing GGC servers constitute a "place" under § 1400(b)? | The physical rack space in the district is a geographic "place" from which Google’s business is carried out. | A "place" requires more than mere presence of equipment; venue requires more traditional property/possession attributes. | A rack or leased shelf can be a "place"; real property ownership or leasehold is not required. |
| Does "place of business" require a regular, physical presence of defendant employees or agents? | No — presence of equipment and performance of services suffice to make the location a place of business. | Yes — the statutory phrase must be read with the related service statute and legislative history to require an agent or employee regularly conducting business there. | Yes — a "regular and established place of business" requires regular, physical presence of an employee or agent conducting the defendant’s business. |
| Were the ISPs hosting and maintaining the GGC servers Google agents conducting Google’s business? | The ISPs performed installation, provided network access, and performed maintenance under Google control, so they acted as Google’s agents. | ISP activities were contracting-for-services, one-time installations, or limited maintenance; they did not constitute conducting Google’s business as an agent. | No — the ISPs were not agents whose activities amounted to Google conducting business in the district; installation and limited maintenance do not satisfy the statute. |
| Is mandamus appropriate to correct district-court venue rulings here? | Not necessary; issues should percolate in district courts and be addressed on appeal. | Mandamus is appropriate because the issue is recurring, undecided, and ordinary appeal may be inadequate to prevent substantial expense. | Mandamus granted: the record shows recurring, unsettled legal questions and inadequate relief by appeal; district court must dismiss or transfer. |
Key Cases Cited
- TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (domestic corporation "resides" only in state of incorporation for patent-venue statute)
- In re Cray, Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (three-part test for "regular and established place of business")
- Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (standards for issuance of mandamus)
- Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003) (elements and contours of agency law)
- In re BigCommerce, Inc., 890 F.3d 978 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (mandamus in venue contexts involving recurring legal questions)
- In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (examples of what may constitute a "place of business")
- Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942) (venue statute interpreted restrictively)