In Re Gene Wild Ins. Trust
340 S.W.3d 139
Mo. Ct. App.2011Background
- On July 10, 1990, Shirley Gene Wild executed the Gene Wild Revocable Trust and the Gene Wild Insurance Trust.
- The Revocable Trust named James H. Wild as Trustee and directed distributions with the residue to two charitable remainder annuity trusts, with College of the Ozarks and Cottey College as the respective remainder beneficiaries.
- The Revocable Trust allowed the Trustee to pay estate and inheritance taxes and to charge such payments to the residue without reimbursement from the grantor’s estate or other persons.
- The Insurance Trust is irrevocable and provides, under Article VII A, an outright gift to persons determined to be responsible for death taxes equal to those taxes, to be paid without burdening the recipients.
- Paragraph B of Article VII provides that funds remaining after funding the gifts are held in trust for James H. Wild during his life and then for his descendants.
- Shirley Gene Wild died on June 19, 2005; James H. Wild, in his individual capacity, disclaimed any personal interest in Insurance Trust distributions on March 10, 2006; U.S. Bank sought guidance on distributions under Article VII A.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Article VII A create an outright gift to death-tax payers consistent with Decedent's intent? | Cunningham argues the gift lapsed because of Revocable Trust prohibitions on reimbursement. | Wild contends the gift is an outright transfer and not a reimbursement, consistent with the trust language. | Yes; the gift is an outright gift consistent with Decedent's intent. |
| Does Revocable Trust residue charging for death taxes prohibit the Insurance Trust gift to Trustee Wild? | Cunningham asserts charging to the Revocable Trust residue defeats the gift to Wild. | Wild contends the limited allocation harmonizes the documents and preserves the gift. | No; interpretation harmonizes the documents and effectuates Decedent's intent. |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Nixon v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., 34 S.W.3d 122 (Mo.2000) (standard for judgment on the pleadings; conceded facts)
- Barker v. Danner, 903 S.W.2d 950 (Mo.App.1995) (judgment on pleadings; admitted facts)
- McIntosh v. Foulke, 228 S.W.2d 757 (Mo.1950) (standard for judgment on pleadings)
- First Natl. Bank of Kansas City v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d 647 (Mo.1962) (trust interpretation; grantor's intent)
- Blue Ridge Bank and Trust Co. v. McFall, 207 S.W.3d 149 (Mo.App.2006) (plain meaning; no rewriting of terms)
- Obermeyer v. Bank of America, N.A., 140 S.W.3d 18 (Mo.banc 2004) (distinct meanings of similar terms; settlor intent)
- Goulding v. Bank of America, N.A., 340 S.W.3d 114 (Mo.App.2010) (different meanings for related terms)
- A.G. Edwards Trust Co. v. Miller, 59 S.W.3d 550 (Mo.App.2001) (trust construction; harmonization approach)