in Re Galveston County Judge Mark Henry, Galveston County Commissioner Ryan Dennard, Galveston County Commissioner Joe Giusti, Galveston County Commissioner Stephen Holmes, Galveston County Commissioner Ken Clark, in Their Official Capacities as the Galve
01-14-00820-CV
| Tex. App. | Feb 19, 2015Background
- Galveston County Commissioners Court (Relators) terminated the County’s Director of Justice Administration and moved to fill the vacancy.
- Judge Lonnie Cox (Respondent), a district judge and county administrative judge, issued an ex parte order sua sponte purporting to nullify the Commissioners Court’s termination and to stop the Court from hiring a replacement, without filing a lawsuit or giving notice or hearing.
- Relators filed an original petition for writ of mandamus (Oct. 7, 2014) asking the Court of Appeals to vacate Judge Cox’s order and an emergency stay.
- A three‑Justice panel of the First Court of Appeals (Jennings, Higley, Huddle) issued a two‑sentence memorandum opinion denying the mandamus petition and dismissing interim relief as moot, without explaining its reasoning.
- Relators moved for rehearing and en banc reconsideration, arguing (1) the ex parte order exceeded district court supervisory and inherent authority because no suit was filed and no due process was afforded, and (2) the panel’s memorandum opinion was improper because it failed to state reasons and involved constitutional and recurring legal issues.
Issues
| Issue | Relators' Argument | Respondent's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a district court may issue an ex parte order exercising supervisory control over a commissioners court without a lawsuit | District courts cannot invoke supervisory jurisdiction over a commissioners court absent a filed suit; the ex parte order was void | (Implicit) District judge asserted supervisory/inherent authority to protect judicial functions | Three‑Justice panel denied mandamus; Relators contend denial was erroneous and seek en banc review |
| Whether a district court may use inherent powers to order county personnel actions without notice/hearing | Inherent powers require high showing, procedural due process, and only for essential non‑discretionary needs; here Respondent made no such showing | Respondent claimed separation‑of‑powers and protection of court functions justified the order | Panel left the ex parte order in place; Relators argue this misapplied inherent‑powers principles |
| Whether the panel erred in issuing a memorandum opinion that lacks explanatory reasoning | Memorandum opinion rule requires stating basic reasons; this order raises constitutional and novel recurring issues making memorandum inappropriate | (Panel implicitly treated issues as settled or not warranting full opinion) | Panel issued a two‑sentence memorandum; Relators argue Rule 47.4 and 52.8(d) require fuller explanation and en banc review |
| Whether Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals (ministerial duty exception) permits ex parte relief here | Mays exception is narrow and applies only to ministerial nondiscretionary statutory duties; facts here are disputed and not ministerial | Respondent relied on inherent/supervisory authority rather than a Mays‑type ministerial order | Relators argue Mays does not apply; panel disposition did not explain why exception was used (if it was) |
Key Cases Cited
- In re El Paso County Com'rs Court, 281 S.W.3d 16 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005) (discusses limits on district courts’ supervisory and inherent power over commissioners courts)
- Ector County v. Stringer, 843 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. 1992) (defines scope of supervisory control over commissioners courts)
- Commissioners Court of Titus County v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1997) (supervisory control only for actions beyond jurisdiction or clear abuse of discretion)
- Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 755 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. 1988) (narrow ministerial‑duty exception allowing judicial direction without notice/hearing)
- Matter of El Paso County Courthouse, 765 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1989) (courts must provide procedural due process when invoking inherent powers)
- Dist. Judges of 188th Judicial Dist. v. County Judge of Gregg County, 657 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1983) (judicial inherent power to compel county support is limited and requires proof of essentiality)
- Vondy v. Commissioners Court of Uvalde County, 620 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1981) (recognizes judicial power to secure staffing but within limits)
- Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1979) (describes courts’ inherent powers to preserve independence and administer justice)