In re: G.T.Â, 250 N.C. App. 50

Newborn Gavin was taken into non-secure custody by DHHS shortly after birth; petition alleged mother used marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine during pregnancy and that Gavin showed withdrawal and a rapid heartbeat.
Mother was involuntarily committed in the hospital, was belligerent with staff, refused psychiatric meds, and hospital staff would not allow her to be alone with the infant.
Father had a DVPO against him for violent conduct (stabbing, jaw dislocation, threats); he was present at the hospital despite no-contact order.
Mother stipulated to most factual allegations; the trial court adjudicated Gavin neglected and dependent and entered interim custody with DHHS.
At disposition the court ordered Gavin remain in DHHS custody and directed that reasonable reunification efforts with mother cease under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-901(c)(1)(e) (chronic/toxic exposure to controlled substances causing impairment or addiction).
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the neglect adjudication but reversed the portion of disposition that ceased reunification efforts, holding the statute requires a prior court determination that an aggravated circumstance exists.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Was the adjudication of neglect supported?	Mother: findings do not show care-related impairment or nexus between drug use and harm.	State/DHHS: mother’s drug use, hospital behavior, and father’s DVPO created injurious environment and risk; infant showed impairment/withdrawal.	Affirmed — stipulations and findings support neglect adjudication and risk of impairment.
2) May the court cease reunification under § 7B-901(c)(1)(e) based on a determination made in the disposition order?	Mother: "has determined" requires a prior court order; cannot be made first in disposition.	Guardian/DHHS: trial court may determine aggravated circumstance at disposition and cease reunification.	Reversed in part — statute requires that a court of competent jurisdiction already have made the determination; trial court erred in relying on its disposition-only finding.
3) Was denial of a continuance to address the § 7B-901(c) issue reversible?	Mother: lack of notice and need for preparation deprived effective representation.	State: denial proper; evidence was competent and dispositive.	Mooted by reversal of the § 7B-901(c) ruling; appellate court did not decide on continuance error.

In re Pittman, 149 N.C. App. 756, 561 S.E.2d 560 (discussing standard of review for neglect adjudications)
In re McLean, 135 N.C. App. 387, 521 S.E.2d 121 (requiring proof of impairment or substantial risk to adjudicate neglect)
Lanvale Props., LLC v. Cty. of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, 731 S.E.2d 800 (statutory interpretation begins with plain language)
In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 260 S.E.2d 591 (trial court’s broad authority to consider evidence at dispositional phase)
In re L.G.I., 227 N.C. App. 512, 742 S.E.2d 832 (evidence of illegal drugs in newborn plus maternal admission supports causation for neonatal exposure)