In re Fry, 300 Ga. 862

Background

In March 2012 David W. Fry entered Alford pleas and received First Offender probation on two felony bribery counts in Richmond County; probation terminated in 2016 with discharge under the First Offender Act.
The State Bar received certified conviction records in 2012 but did not promptly pursue disciplinary action; it initiated proceedings in 2016 under Bar Rule 4-106 seeking show-cause why Fry should not be disbarred.
After a special master was appointed, Fry filed a “Petition for Voluntary Resolution” under State Bar Governance Rule 1-208 asking the Bar to dismiss the disciplinary proceeding so he could resign in lieu of discipline and pledged not to seek readmission.
The Bar and special master both recommended accepting Fry’s proposal, citing mitigation (delay by Bar, Fry’s age, ill health, limited practice) and public protection by removing him from the rolls.
The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the recommendation, addressed whether an Alford plea constitutes a felony conviction for disciplinary purposes, and rejected Fry’s petition, remanding for further proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Fry's Argument	State Bar's Argument	Held
Whether an Alford plea/First Offender treatment constitutes a conviction violating Rule 8.4(a)(2)	Alford plea might not amount to a Rule 8.4(a)(2) conviction	An Alford plea with certified imposition of first offender probation is a conviction for Rule 8.4(a)(2) purposes	Alford plea/first offender probation does constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(2)
Whether the Court may accept a voluntary resignation-style resolution while disciplinary proceedings are pending	Requested dismissal of disciplinary case so he could resign and waive readmission	Bar supported the resolution as reasonable given mitigation	Court declined to create an alternative to voluntary surrender; rejected petition and remanded
Whether delay by the Bar and Fry’s health/age justify the unusual resolution	Delay and Fry’s alleged ill health and limited practice justify compassionate dismissal and resignation	Bar acknowledged delay as mitigating and recommended acceptance	Court found mitigation insufficient to permit wiping Fry’s disciplinary record; medical proof was inadequate and delay did not show actual prejudice
Whether Fry’s proposed resignation would effectively expunge Georgia disciplinary record for other jurisdictions	Proposed resignation would remove Fry from Georgia rolls and he agreed not to seek readmission (disputed scope to other jurisdictions)	Bar said Fry agreed not to seek readmission in Georgia or other jurisdictions (ambiguity exists)	Court noted uncertainty and declined to endorse a resolution that could leave Fry with no Georgia disciplinary record while criminal matters remain public

Key Cases Cited

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (Alford plea doctrine) (1970) (establishes defendant may plead guilty while asserting innocence under certain circumstances)
In the Matter of Davis, 292 Ga. 897 (2013) (Alford plea qualifies as conviction for disciplinary purposes)
In the Matter of Ortman, 289 Ga. 130 (2011) (same)
In the Matter of Suttle, 288 Ga. 14 (2010) (same)
In the Matter of Davidson, 269 Ga. 901 (1998) (discussing disciplinary resignation and voluntary surrender equivalence)
In the Matter of Atkins, 253 Ga. 319 (1984) (resignation after initiation of disciplinary proceedings does not substitute for voluntary surrender of license)
In the Matter of Reed, 244 Ga. 612 (1979) (accepted voluntary resignation where attorney admitted conduct violating professional standards)