in Re: Fort Apache Energy, Inc., Allan P. Bloxsom, and Drilling Risk Management, Inc.
482 S.W.3d 667
| Tex. App. | 2015Background
- Fort Apache sued Huddleston in Kendall County alleging breach of participation/operating agreements and seeking transfer of Huddleston’s interest after default.
- Huddleston later sued Fort Apache and other relators in Dallas County asserting related contract, fiduciary, fraud, and accounting claims.
- Kendall County refused a transfer of venue to Dallas; Dallas denied relators’ plea in abatement asserting Kendall had dominant jurisdiction.
- Dallas County set trial for February 22, 2016; Kendall County set trial for March 14, 2016.
- Relators sought mandamus in the court of appeals to compel the Dallas trial court to abate; the majority denied mandamus, concluding relators have an adequate appellate remedy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dallas court abused discretion by denying plea in abatement (dominant-jurisdiction) | Relators: Kendall County has dominant jurisdiction because the suits arise from the same transactions and parties can be joined there; Dallas should have abated. | Real party/Huddleston: Dallas court can proceed; both courts have jurisdiction and Dallas did not unlawfully interfere. | Majority: Did not decide abuse-of-discretion; denied mandamus because adequate appellate remedy exists. Dissent: Dallas abused discretion; Kendall is dominant. |
| Whether mandamus is available (adequate appellate remedy) | Relators: Appeal is inadequate because Dallas’s earlier trial setting actively interferes with Kendall’s dominant jurisdiction and risks wasted resources. | Respondent: Appeal is adequate for resolving an incidental ruling on dominant jurisdiction; no active interference warranting mandamus. | Majority: Appeal is typically adequate for such rulings; mandamus denied. Dissent: Adequate remedy lacking due to active interference from conflicting trial settings; would grant mandamus. |
| Whether conflicting trial settings here rise to "active interference" under Abor/Perry | Relators: A trial date set before the dominant court’s date constitutes active interference warranting mandamus. | Respondent: The scheduling order does not amount to the severe, time-sensitive conflict shown in Perry; no interference sufficient for mandamus. | Majority: The circumstances do not match Perry’s time-critical posture; no mandamus. Dissent: The earlier Dallas setting does interfere and matches Abor/Perry principles; mandamus appropriate. |
| Whether In re Prudential’s balancing test supplants Abor’s active-interference rule | Relators: Prudential’s balancing of public/private interests can justify mandamus even absent bright-line active interference. | Respondent/Majority: Prudential does not overrule controlling precedent; Abor remains binding until supreme court changes it. | Majority: Prudential does not permit disregarding controlling precedent (Abor); deny mandamus. Dissent: Even under Abor, active interference exists here; would grant mandamus. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (mandamus availability requires balancing adequacy of appellate remedy)
- Hall v. Lawlis, 907 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1995) (mandamus generally not available to decide dominant jurisdiction between two courts absent interference)
- Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1985) (mandamus denied where no active interference with dominant court)
- Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2001) (mandamus granted where conflicting trial settings threatened timeliness and state interests)
- In re Puig, 351 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. 2011) (reaffirming adequacy-of-appeal rule in dictum)
- Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. 1974) (mandamus appropriate where second court interferes with prior action)
- Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1988) (dominant-jurisdiction test: inherent interrelation and joinder/compulsory counterclaim guidance)