In re Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Litigation, 522 F.Supp.3d 617

Plaintiffs filed a class action under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) challenging Facebook’s Tag Suggestions for creating/storing face templates without consent; a class of Illinois users was certified.
The district court held that a statutory BIPA violation suffices for Article III standing; the Ninth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court denied certiorari; the Illinois Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Rosenbach.
After preliminary approval was denied, parties renegotiated: Facebook increased the non‑reversionary fund to $650 million, agreed to change Face Recognition defaults to off (absent express consent), delete templates for nonconsenting or inactive users, and narrowed the release.
The notice/claims program used extensive online outreach (email, Facebook notices, web ads, newspapers) and behavioral design input, producing ~1.57 million valid claims (~22% claims rate) and only 109 opt‑outs and three objections.
The court granted final approval, awarded class counsel fees and costs (reduced from requested), approved administrator costs, and ordered incentive awards to the three named plaintiffs; all objections were overruled.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant/Objectors' Argument	Held
Article III standing (injury in fact)	BIPA statutory violation is a concrete injury sufficient for Article III.	Statutory violation without concrete harm is not Article III injury.	Court held statutory BIPA violation suffices; Ninth Circuit affirmed; cert. denied.
Choice of law / standard for final approval	Apply transferee court law (Ninth Circuit) for Rule 23(e) and fee issues.	Objectors urged Seventh Circuit approach.	Applied Ninth Circuit precedent under Newton; Rule 23(e)(2) factors used.
Adequacy of relief / fairness of $650M settlement	$650M fund, injunctive changes, strong notice, high claims rate, and litigation risks justify settlement.	Objectors argued settlement undervalues statutory damages and leaves money on table; release scope concerns.	Settlement approved as fair, reasonable, adequate given trial/appellate risks, claims rate, injunctive relief, and potential due‑process issues for massive statutory awards.
Attorneys’ fees / percentage vs lodestar	Requested $110M (16.9% of $650M; or 20% of prior $550M) justified by results and dataset of comparable megasettlements.	Objectors argued benchmark/percentage should be reduced for a megafund; watch for windfall.	Court awarded 15% ($97.5M), holding 15% of that pending accounting; lodestar cross‑check supported a 4.71 multiplier.

Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197 (Ill. 2019) (Illinois Supreme Court adopting similar BIPA interpretation on who is an “aggrieved” person)
In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litig., 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011) (factors for assessing class‑action settlement fairness and fee methodology)
Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004) (multi‑factor framework for evaluating class settlements)
Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp., 563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009) (court’s fiduciary role and lodestar/percentage considerations)
In re Washington Public Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) (common fund principle and fee‑award methods)
In re Optical Disk Drive Products Antitrust Litig., 959 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2020) (megafund settlements warrant adjusting percentage benchmarks)
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002) (market‑rate expectations and comparative percentage data for fee awards)
Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003) (common fund fees as equitable substitute for private fee agreements)
In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010) (district court’s fiduciary responsibility in fee awards)
Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 331 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 2003) (due‑process concerns about very large class statutory damages)