In re Estate of Wall
2017 Ohio 5713
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Mother Willie Mae and daughter Crystal lived together; Crystal was found dead and Willie Mae died shortly after from a stress-induced event. Willie Mae died less than 120 hours after Crystal.
- Crystal’s will devised her entire estate to her mother "if she survives me," with alternate beneficiaries "should she predecease me."
- Crystal’s will was admitted to probate; Willie Mae died intestate and an estate was opened for her.
- Appellant William (Crystal’s brother and heir of Willie Mae) argued Willie Mae should take under Crystal’s will (even though she survived Crystal by less than 120 hours) so Crystal’s estate would pass to Willie Mae’s estate before distribution to Willie Mae’s heirs.
- Appellee Alexander (Executor of Crystal’s estate) argued R.C. 2105.32 (the 120-hour survivorship presumption) treats anyone not proved to have survived by 120 hours as having predeceased the decedent, so Willie Mae cannot inherit.
- The probate court ruled R.C. 2105.32 applied and the will’s language did not fall within the exception in R.C. 2105.36(A); this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Crystal’s will "if she survives me" / "should she predecease me" language falls within R.C. 2105.36(A) exception to the 120-hour survivorship presumption | Wall (Appellant) relied on Kerlee to argue that the will’s conditional language is sufficient to except the devise from the 120-hour rule so a beneficiary who survives any period (even <120 hours) takes | Executor (Appellee) argued R.C. 2105.32 deems anyone not shown by clear and convincing evidence to have survived 120 hours as having predeceased the decedent; R.C. 2105.36(A) requires the governing instrument to explicitly address simultaneous/common-disaster deaths to override the presumption | Court held the will’s ordinary conditional language is not "explicit" about simultaneous or common-disaster deaths; R.C. 2105.32 applies and Willie Mae is deemed to have predeceased Crystal for survivorship purposes |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. S.R., 63 Ohio St.3d 590 (Ohio 1992) (statutory interpretation: legislative intent and plain-language principles)
- Independent Ins. Agents of Ohio, Inc. v. Fabe, 63 Ohio St.3d 310 (Ohio 1992) (statutory words construed in context; common usage)
- Johnson's Markets, Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. of Health, 58 Ohio St.3d 28 (Ohio 1991) (court must give effect to all words of a statute)
- Cline v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 61 Ohio St.3d 93 (Ohio 1991) (court may not insert or delete statutory language)
- In re Estate of Ida D. Kerlee, 557 P.2d 599 (Idaho 1976) (Idaho held simple survivorship language can trigger exception to its survivorship statute; discussed and rejected as persuasive authority)
