In re Estate of Tyler
80 A.3d 797
Pa. Super. Ct.2013Background
- Jessie M. Tyler executed a 2002 Will and a 2003 codicil (both admitted to probate); Attorney Allen Hench was the longtime scrivener.
- On September 8, 2010 Hench met with Decedent, made handwritten changes on a photocopy of the 2002 Will altering specific bequests and the residuary clause, and Decedent signed next to most changes; Hench also wrote a note to his secretary: “do a codicil…”
- Decedent died October 21, 2010; Hench submitted the 2002 Will, the 2003 codicil, and the September 8, 2010 document for probate; the Register of Wills denied probate of the September 8 document.
- The orphans’ court found the September 8 document nontestamentary because it showed that a formal codicil was contemplated (scrivener’s note and use of a photocopy), thereby excluding extrinsic evidence of testamentary intent; it admitted the 2002 Will and 2003 codicil.
- This Court (majority) reversed in part: held the orphans’ court erred as a matter of law in declaring the document nontestamentary, found the writing ambiguous, and remanded for hearings to determine testamentary intent; a dissent would have admitted the document to probate without further hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Sept. 8, 2010 handwritten document is testamentary (a valid codicil) | Henrys/Hench: signatures by Decedent next to changes and Hench’s witness signature show testamentary intent; writing should be admitted | Register/Orphans’ ct: the document was merely notes toward a future formal codicil (scrivener’s instruction and use of a copy), so nontestamentary | Majority: document ambiguous; orphans’ ct erred to declare it nontestamentary as a matter of law; remand for extrinsic-evidence hearings to determine intent |
| Whether extrinsic evidence of Decedent’s intent should be admitted | Henrys: extrinsic evidence unnecessary because signatures and form show intent | Register: extrinsic evidence precluded if document is nontestamentary | Held: because document is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible; remand to take such evidence |
| Whether signature placement (not literally at document end) invalidates the writing under §2502 | Henrys: signature adjacent to each change is sufficient; statute does not invalidate when other words appear after signature | Register: placement and post-signature entries (and use of copy) weigh against testamentary character | Held: majority did not decide invalidity under statute; remanded because ambiguity about signature purpose and surrounding circumstances requires factfinding |
| Whether the orphans’ court relied improperly on scrivener’s plans over Decedent’s intent | Henrys: court focused on scrivener’s note and method (improper) rather than Decedent’s intent | Orphans’ ct: scrivener’s note evidenced that a further document was contemplated | Held: majority agrees court erred to exclude intent evidence based solely on scrivener’s note; factual development required on Decedent’s intent |
Key Cases Cited
- Estate of Shelly, 950 A.2d 1021 (Pa.Super.2008) (test for whether a writing is testamentary, and when extrinsic evidence is allowed)
- In re Kauffman’s Estate, 76 A.2d 414 (Pa. 1950) (writing signed by decedent manifesting intent must be given effect as will or codicil)
- In re Bosley, 26 A.3d 1104 (Pa.Super.2011) (standard of review in will contests and credibility determinations)
- Estate of Reichel, 400 A.2d 1268 (Pa. 1979) (appellate scope of review of factual findings in will contests)
- Estate of Masciantonio, 141 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1958) (presumption against setting aside trial court findings unless unsupported by evidence)
- In re Moore’s Estate, 277 A.2d 825 (Pa. 1971) (extrinsic evidence inadmissible when paper clearly shows testamentary character)
- In re Ritchie’s Estate, 389 A.2d 83 (Pa. 1978) (focus on whether writing was intended as the final testamentary instrument)
- In re Logan, 413 A.2d 681 (Pa. 1980) (initial judicial inquiry whether a proffered paper shows testamentary intent as a matter of law)
