In re Estate of Psota
297 Neb. 570
Neb.2017Background
- Sharlene and Eldon Psota married in September 2011; one week before the wedding Eldon proposed a prenuptial agreement which Sharlene reviewed, revised, and signed the day before the wedding.
- The prenup recited mutual full disclosure, disclaimed any inheritance or interest in the other’s property, and waived elective share, homestead, exempt and family allowances, and testate/intestate rights.
- Attached exhibits purported to list each party’s real property (no valuations), did not list personal property, and did not include tax returns.
- Eldon died in August 2013; his will (from ~8 years before the marriage) left nothing to Sharlene; the estate was worth about $10 million, largely real property.
- Sharlene applied to be treated as an omitted spouse under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2320; the estate contended she had validly waived those rights under § 30-2316.
- The county court found the prenup enforceable; Sharlene appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding she failed to prove the waiver unenforceable because she did not show it was executed involuntarily under § 30-2316(b)(1).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Psota) | Defendant's Argument (Estate) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 30-2316(b) requires proof of both subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) to invalidate a waiver | § 30-2316 should be read like § 42-1006 (which uses “or”), so Psota need only prove either involuntariness or unconscionability | The statute’s plain text omits “or,” so the surviving spouse must satisfy both (b)(1) and (b)(2) | Court: Must satisfy both subsections; Legislature’s differing word choice was intentional and courts may not add words to statute |
| Whether Sharlene executed the waiver voluntarily under § 30-2316(b)(1) | Execution was not voluntary in a substantive sense; voluntariness should consider Edwards/Mamot multi-factor analysis (proximity, counsel, disclosure, bargaining power, understanding) | Sharlene signed the agreement at counsel’s office and conceded she executed it voluntarily; procedural voluntariness established | Court: Psota conceded she signed voluntarily; she failed to prove lack of voluntariness, so waiver stands |
| Whether the prenup failed statutory disclosure requirements (unconscionability/§ 30-2316(b)(2)) | Prenup omitted valuations, personal property, and tax returns, so it was unconscionable and lacked adequate disclosure/knowledge | Estate: disclosure language and exhibit references satisfied requirements; Psota could have known Eldon’s assets | Court: Did not reach substantive unconscionability because Psota failed (b)(1); since both (b)(1) and (b)(2) are required, failure on (b)(1) is dispositive |
| Whether Edwards/Mamot factors should control interpretation of “voluntarily” under § 30-2316(b)(1) | Court should apply the Edwards/Mamot multi-factor test to assess voluntariness | Statutory text controls; mixing factors blurs distinct statutory elements and is unnecessary where voluntariness was conceded | Court: Declined to import Edwards/Mamot test into § 30-2316(b)(1); focus on plain meaning of “voluntarily” and record showing voluntary signing |
Key Cases Cited
- Mamot v. Mamot, 283 Neb. 659, 813 N.W.2d 440 (discussing burden to prove premarital agreement unenforceable and applying Edwards factors)
- In re Estate of Pluhacek, 296 Neb. 528, 894 N.W.2d 325 (applying § 30-2316 principles in probate context)
- Edwards v. Edwards, 16 Neb. App. 297, 744 N.W.2d 243 (court of appeals decision adopting multi-factor voluntariness test)
- In re Conservatorship of Abbott, 295 Neb. 510, 890 N.W.2d 469 (appellate principle: courts need not decide unnecessary issues)