In re Estate of Psota
297 Neb. 570
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Sharlene Psota sought to be treated as an omitted spouse under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2320 after Eldon Psota died without providing for her in his will.
- The copersonal representatives resisted, asserting Sharlene waived rights via a prenuptial agreement signed before marriage.
- Eldon and Sharlene married in 2011; a prenup stated they disclaimed any inheritance or interest in the other’s property and included disclosure attestations.
- Eldon died in 2013; the estate’s inventory totaled about $10 million, largely real property; Eldon’s will left nothing to Sharlene.
- The probate court found the prenuptial agreement to be a valid waiver under § 30-2316 and denied the omitted-spouse application.
- Sharlene appealed, arguing the waiver was unenforceable; the issue centralizes whether § 30-2316(b)(1) and (b)(2) require proof of both elements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 30-2316(b)(1) and (b)(2) require proof of both elements to make a waiver unenforceable. | Psota urged an 'or' approach as in § 42-1006(1). | Estate argued the plain statute requires both elements to be proven. | Burden requires proof of both; no 'or' implied by § 30-2316(b). |
| Whether Sharlene proved lack of voluntariness under § 30-2316(b)(1). | Sharlene contends Edwards/Mamot factors apply to voluntariness. | Court should not import Edwards/Mamot; focus on statutory text. | Sharlene did not prove lack of voluntariness; she voluntarily signed. |
| Whether the waiver was unconscionable under § 30-2316(b)(2). | If voluntariness failed, unconscionability could negate the waiver. | Independent assessment of unconscionability required only if (b)(1) proved. | Not reached because (b)(1) not proven. |
| Effect of the statutory structure on the burden of proof for premarital waivers. | Laud additional factors should apply to determine voluntariness. | Legislature’s structure implies independent, dual-proof burden is required. | Plain-language interpretation: burden on survivor to prove both (b)(1) and (b)(2). |
| Whether the contract’s disclosure and asset-identification omissions affect enforceability. | Disclosures were incomplete; could support unconscionability. | Court focuses on statutory burden; not enough to negate voluntariness. | Not decisive; the dispositive issue is voluntariness under § 30-2316(b)(1). |
Key Cases Cited
- Mamot v. Mamot, 283 Neb. 659 (2012) (premarital waiver burden—proof of voluntary execution or unconscionability)
- Edwards v. Edwards, 16 Neb. App. 297 (2008) (five-factor consideration of premarital agreement execution)
- In re Estate of Pluhacek, 296 Neb. 528 (2017) (context for unconscionability and disclosure standards)
- In re Conservatorship of Abbott, 295 Neb. 510 (2017) (utility of established probate standards in related contexts)
