In re Estate of Psota
297 Neb. 570
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Sharlene and Eldon Psota married in September 2011; Eldon proposed a prenuptial agreement shortly before the wedding which both signed after meeting with Eldon’s chosen attorney and submitting revisions requested by Sharlene.
- The prenuptial agreement stated both parties disclaimed any inheritance or interest in the other’s pre-marital property, recited full disclosure, and attached exhibits listing each party’s real property (without valuations) but omitted personal property lists and tax returns.
- Eldon’s will (executed about 8 years before the marriage) left nothing to Sharlene; Eldon died in August 2013 and his estate inventory showed about $10 million, mainly real property.
- In November 2015, Sharlene applied to be treated as an omitted spouse under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2320, which permits an omitted spouse to take a statutory share unless rights were waived under § 30-2316.
- The county court held the prenuptial agreement was a valid waiver under § 30-2316 and denied Sharlene’s omitted-spouse claim; Sharlene appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Sharlene) | Defendant's Argument (Estate / Copersonal Reps) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 30-2316(b) requires proving BOTH voluntariness and the § 30-2316(b)(2) elements to invalidate a waiver | § 30-2316 should be read like § 42-1006 (use of “or”): only one prong (e.g., unconscionability/disclosure failure) need be proved | Omission of “or” in § 30-2316(b) was intentional; survivor must prove both subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) | Court: Survivor must satisfy both (b)(1) and (b)(2) because statute’s plain language omits “or” |
| Whether Sharlene did not execute the waiver voluntarily under § 30-2316(b)(1) | Execution was not voluntary in a meaningful sense—voluntariness should consider factors like proximity to wedding, independent counsel, unequal bargaining power, and disclosure (Edwards/Mamot factors) | Sharlene signed voluntarily at the attorney’s office and conceded she signed; voluntariness here means intentional signing without coercion | Court: Sharlene conceded she signed voluntarily; probate court correctly found execution was voluntary, so (b)(1) not met |
| Whether the prenuptial’s disclosure provisions (no valuations, missing personal property/tax returns) rendered the waiver unenforceable under § 30-2316(b)(2) | Agreement lacked fair and reasonable disclosure and Sharlene lacked adequate knowledge of Eldon’s assets | Estate: Agreement’s language and attachments plus Sharlene’s opportunity to review meant disclosure was sufficient; but court need not reach (b)(2) if (b)(1) fails | Court: Did not reach (b)(2) because Sharlene failed to prove (b)(1); affirmed denial of omitted-spouse relief |
| Whether courts may import the Edwards/Mamot five-factor voluntariness test into § 30-2316(b)(1) analysis | Edwards/Mamot five-factor test should apply to § 30-2316 to assess voluntariness beyond mere signing | Statutory framework separates voluntariness and disclosure/unconscionability; combining factors would conflate prongs and alter statutory burden | Court: Declined to adopt Edwards/Mamot test here; applying it would conflate statutory elements and Sharlene did not show how those factors would change the voluntariness finding |
Key Cases Cited
- Mamot v. Mamot, 283 Neb. 659, 813 N.W.2d 440 (interpreting voluntariness and premarital agreement challenges under § 42-1006)
- In re Estate of Pluhacek, 296 Neb. 528, 894 N.W.2d 325 (precedent on § 30-2316 application in probate context)
- In re Conservatorship of Abbott, 295 Neb. 510, 890 N.W.2d 469 (noting appellate courts may avoid analyses unnecessary to resolve an appeal)
- Edwards v. Edwards, 16 Neb. App. 297, 744 N.W.2d 243 (Court of Appeals applying the Edwards/Mamot factors in premarital agreement challenges)