In re Estate of Psota
297 Neb. 570
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Sharlene and Eldon Psota married in September 2011; each had prior marriages and children. Six days before the wedding they signed a prenuptial agreement prepared by an attorney Eldon selected.
- The agreement recited mutual complete waivers of inheritance rights, referenced Exhibits listing each party’s real property (without valuations), and stated each party had personal knowledge of the other’s full property. No tax returns or personal property lists were attached.
- Eldon’s will (executed about 8 years before the marriage) left nothing to Sharlene. Eldon died in 2013; his estate inventory showed about $10 million, largely real property.
- In November 2015 Sharlene filed to be treated as an omitted spouse under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2320; the estate responded the prenuptial waiver was enforceable under § 30-2316.
- The county probate court found the prenuptial agreement valid and that Sharlene knowingly and voluntarily executed the waiver; it denied her omitted-spouse claim. Sharlene appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Sharlene) | Defendant's Argument (Estate) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 30-2316(b) requires proof of both voluntariness and unconscionability/disclosure elements or only one | § 30-2316(b) should be read like § 42-1006(1) (which uses “or”), so Sharlene need only prove either non-voluntariness or the subsection (2) factors | Omission of the word “or” in § 30-2316(b) is intentional; plaintiff must satisfy both subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) to render a waiver unenforceable | Court: plaintiff must prove both (b)(1) and (b)(2) because the statute omits “or” and must be applied as written |
| Whether Sharlene did not execute the waiver voluntarily | The term “voluntarily” should encompass broader factors (timing, independent counsel, inequality, disclosure, understanding) and those factors show non-voluntariness | Sharlene signed voluntarily; she conceded she went to the attorney’s office and signed, and record does not show coercion | Court: voluntariness means intentional execution without coercion; Sharlene conceded she signed voluntarily and failed to prove she did not |
| Whether the waiver was unenforceable under the disclosure/unconscionability prong of § 30-2316(b)(2) | Argued inadequate disclosure (no valuations, no personal property listed, no tax returns) and potential unconscionability | Estate argued disclosures and agreement language were sufficient and that plaintiff failed her burden on both subsections | Court: did not reach (b)(2) because plaintiff failed to satisfy (b)(1); waiver held enforceable |
| Whether the Edwards/Mamot premarital-agreement analysis should apply to § 30-2316 cases | Sharlene urged applying Edwards/Mamot factors to broaden “voluntarily” analysis | Estate argued statutory text controls and Edwards/Mamot combines (b)(1) and (b)(2) elements improperly | Court: declined to import Edwards/Mamot approach; applied statutory text instead |
Key Cases Cited
- Mamot v. Mamot, 283 Neb. 659 (interpreting premarital-agreement unenforceability standard and burden under § 42-1006)
- In re Estate of Pluhacek, 296 Neb. 528 (probate review principles and related statutory interpretation)
- Edwards v. Edwards, 16 Neb. App. 297 (Nebraska Court of Appeals applying premarital-agreement voluntariness factors)
- In re Conservatorship of Abbott, 295 Neb. 510 (appellate principle: avoid analysis unnecessary to resolve appeal)