In re Estate of Psota
297 Neb. 570
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Sharlene and Eldon Psota married in September 2011; each had prior marriages and children. About one week before the wedding they executed a prenuptial agreement drafted by Eldon’s chosen attorney.
- The prenuptial agreement disclaimed any inheritance or property interest in the other’s premarital property, stated both parties made full disclosure, and listed each party’s real property on Exhibits A and B (no valuations, no personal property lists, no tax returns).
- Eldon died in August 2013; his will (executed ~8 years earlier) left nothing to Sharlene; the estate inventory showed roughly $10 million, largely real property.
- In November 2015 Sharlene applied to be treated as an omitted spouse under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2320; the estate resisted, arguing she waived rights in the prenuptial agreement and that § 30-2316 renders the waiver enforceable.
- The county (probate) court found the prenuptial waiver valid and that Sharlene knowingly and voluntarily executed it; Sharlene appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Sharlene) | Defendant's Argument (Estate) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the waiver was executed "voluntarily" under § 30-2316(b)(1) | Execution was not truly voluntary because she lacked adequate opportunity, independent counsel, disclosure and was surprised by timing — voluntariness should include Edwards/Mamot factors | She signed the agreement intentionally at the attorney’s office and thus executed it voluntarily | Court held Sharlene conceded she signed voluntarily and failed to prove lack of voluntariness; probate court’s finding affirmed |
| Whether the disclosure/knowledge requirements of § 30-2316(b)(2) were unmet (no valuations, missing personal property and tax returns) | Agreement’s exhibits and missing tax returns/personals meant she lacked adequate knowledge and fair disclosure, making waiver unenforceable | The agreement stated full disclosure and that parties had personal knowledge; estate relied on statutory framework permitting waiver | Court did not reach § 30-2316(b)(2) because Sharlene failed to satisfy (b)(1); burden requires proving both subsections, so failure on (b)(1) ends inquiry |
| Proper statutory burden of proof under § 30-2316(b): must prove either (1) or (2) vs. both | Court should read an "or" into § 30-2316(b) analogous to § 42-1006 so proving either voluntariness or unconscionability/disclosure suffices | The statutory text omits "or" in § 30-2316(b); the Legislature enacted § 30-2316 and § 42-1006 together and used different language intentionally | Court held plain text requires satisfying both subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2); therefore Sharlene bore the burden to prove both and failed on (b)(1) |
Key Cases Cited
- Mamot v. Mamot, 283 Neb. 659 (interpreting premarital-agreement standard and burden where statute uses "or")
- In re Estate of Pluhacek, 296 Neb. 528 (application of § 30-2316 in probate context)
- Edwards v. Edwards, 16 Neb. App. 297 (discussing five-factor voluntariness test in premarital agreement context)
- In re Marriage of Bonds, 24 Cal. 4th 1 (California case identifying five-factor test courts may consider on voluntariness/disclosure)
- In re Conservatorship of Abbott, 295 Neb. 510 (appellate courts need not decide issues unnecessary to resolve the appeal)