In Re Estate of Pendergrass, 26 A.3d 1151

The decedent Theodore D. Pendergrass was a paraplegic and Mrs. Joan Pendergrass acted as his power of attorney.
The decedent died on January 13, 2010, survived by a spouse, two daughters, a son, and two stepdaughters.
A probated March 25, 2009 will and a codicil dated October 17, 2009 were joint between decedent and spouse; the codicil revoked certain gifts and ratified the March will, but did not mention a May 2009 will.
The October codicil was signed by Mrs. Pendergrass as "Joan Pendergrass, agent for T.D.P." and also by her as testatrix; Mr. Pendergrass sought to strike the codicil for lack of proper execution.
The orphans’ court granted Mr. Pendergrass’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding an agent could not execute a testamentary document for the principal; it also discussed that initials might satisfy § 2502(3) if signed in testator’s name, but not when signed as agent.
The Superior Court quashed both appeals for lack of aggrievement, and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the codicil was properly admitted to probate given the signing by an agent.	Pendergrass argues the testator’s name was not subscribed by the testator.	Pendergrass (Executrix) argues the codicil was properly executed by the agent and valid.	Orphans’ Court ruling in favor of striking codicil affirmed (codicil improperly executed).
Whether the decree admitting probate of the codicil should be struck in its entirety.	Mr. Pendergrass argues for broader striking of the decree.	Mrs. Pendergrass contends the scope is proper as pleaded.	Appeal by Mr. Pendergrass quashed for lack of aggrievement; decree not overturned on that ground.
Whether a testator’s initials can satisfy the signature requirement under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(3) when signed by an agent.	Pendergrass argues initial signature could suffice.	Orphans’ Court dicta suggesting initials could suffice was not applicable since signing was by an agent.	Court accepted the orphans’ court’s view that signing by an agent cannot satisfy § 2502(3) when signed as agent.
Whether Mr. Pendergrass had standing to appeal the orphans’ court order.	Mr. Pendergrass appeals as aggrieved party.	No aggrievement; prevailing party cannot appeal; executrix also not aggrieved.	Mr. Pendergrass’s appeal quashed; Mrs. Pendergrass’s appeal also quashed; case remanded.

In re Harper, 975 A.2d 1155 (Pa. Super. 2009) (permits immediate appeal from certain orphans’ court orders)
Ratti v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 758 A.2d 695 (Pa. Super. 2000) (aggrieved party standard for standing to appeal)
Clairton Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins., 438 Pa. Super. 488, 652 A.2d 916 (Pa. Super. 1995) (standing and aggrievement principles in appeals)
Green v. SEPTA, 380 Pa. Super. 268, 551 A.2d 578 (Pa. Super. 1988) (standing concepts in appellate review)
Estate of Karahuta, 481 Pa. 512, 514, 393 A.2d 22 (Pa. 1978) (executor not party aggrieved by decree between beneficiaries)
Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1975) (standing related to aggrievement)
Pierro v. Pierro, 434 Pa. 131, 252 A.2d 652 (Pa. 1969) (injury requirement to be proper appellant)
In re Elliott's Estate, 388 Pa. 321, 131 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1957) (early standing and appeal considerations)