In re Estate of Lakin
310 Neb. 271
| Neb. | 2021Background
- Decedent Charles E. Lakin died in March 2016 with an estate (~$170M) and a revocable trust naming the Charles E. Lakin Foundation as primary beneficiary; Thomas Pribil (longtime employee) and William Kilzer (grandson) were appointed copersonal representatives and cotrustees.
- In 1984 Lakin and Pribil executed a written instrument titled “Promissory Note” providing $1.2M (plus $50,000/year thereafter) payable on Pribil’s 60th birthday or at Lakin’s death; instrument described the amounts as additional compensation for Pribil’s employment (deferred wages).
- After Lakin’s death, Pribil (with Kilzer’s consent and without court approval) caused payment of approximately $6.946M to himself in September 2016 by liquidating trust securities; Pribil did not file a claim in the probate proceedings.
- The Foundation sued in probate and trust actions seeking removal, surcharge, accounting, and to compel distribution; the county court granted summary judgment to Pribil and Kilzer, finding no fiduciary breach and that payment was permitted.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court held the payment was barred because Pribil failed to present a claim under the probate nonclaim statute, and it found genuine issues of material fact remained on the Foundation’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims; the grant of summary judgment was reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nature of the 1984 instrument: promissory note vs. deferred compensation | Foundation: instrument should be treated as a promissory note (not deferred comp). | Pribil: instrument is deferred compensation for services rendered. | Court: substance controls; instrument is deferred compensation (deferred wages). |
| Statute of limitations | Foundation: demand date triggered in 2007 (Pribil’s 60th) so 5‑yr limitations bar applied before payment. | Defs: limitations did not accrue until work completed / decedent’s death. | Court: limitations did not run until Pribil ceased working for Lakin (death), so SOL did not bar payment. |
| Requirement to present a claim in probate before payment | Foundation: debt arose during Lakin’s life (deferred wages) and required a timely probate claim; none was filed, so claim is barred. | Defs: payments were wages/admin expenses after death or otherwise authorized by personal representatives/trustee powers, so no claim was required. | Court: debt was for wages earned during Lakin’s life; probate nonclaim statute required a claim; Pribil failed to present one and the estate payment was barred. |
| Breach of fiduciary duty / summary judgment | Foundation: paying a barred claim, failing to notify beneficiary, liquidating trust assets, and paying without court approval breached fiduciary duties; removal/surcharge warranted. | Defs: they acted within trustee/PR discretion, followed counsel/accountant advice, and complied with trust directions. | Court: genuine issues of material fact exist on fiduciary-duty claims; summary judgment for defendants improper; matter remanded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sundermann v. Hy‑Vee, 306 Neb. 749, 947 N.W.2d 492 (2020) (summary judgment standards)
- Marcovitz v. Rogers, 276 Neb. 199, 752 N.W.2d 605 (2008) (equity looks to substance over form in characterizing a written instrument)
- Dooling v. Dooling, 303 Neb. 494, 930 N.W.2d 481 (2019) (discussion of deferred compensation concept)
- Weiss v. Weiss, 179 Neb. 714, 140 N.W.2d 15 (1966) (limitations on deferred compensation claims)
- J.R. Simplot Co. v. Jelinek, 275 Neb. 548, 748 N.W.2d 17 (2008) (mere notice to personal representative is not a statutory claim presentation)
- In re Estate of Muncillo, 280 Neb. 669, 789 N.W.2d 37 (2010) (orders denying appointment of a special administrator are final and appealable)
- Hearst‑Argyle Prop. v. Entrex Comm. Servs., 279 Neb. 468, 778 N.W.2d 465 (2010) (defective notice of appeal not fatal where no party was misled)
- In re Estate of Feuerhelm, 215 Neb. 872, 341 N.W.2d 342 (1983) (requirements for adequate claim presentation under probate statutes)
