In re Estate of Ivy
131 N.E.3d 1181
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- In October 2013 Mordechai Faskowitz stabbed and killed his longtime partner; he was later tried on two counts of first‑degree murder and a concealment charge.
- At trial Faskowitz pleaded insanity; three experts testified he was legally insane and lacked capacity to appreciate criminality, and the criminal court found him not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) on all counts.
- Decedent died intestate and Faskowitz was named a beneficiary of several accounts and a trust; the estate’s independent administrator (Ivy) sought to disqualify him under Illinois’ Slayer Statute (755 ILCS 5/2‑6).
- The Probate Court granted summary judgment for the estate, reasoning that the criminal NGRI finding (and the criminal judge’s statements) collaterally estopped Faskowitz from disputing that he “intentionally and unjustifiably” caused the death.
- The Appellate Court reversed: it held the Slayer Statute’s conclusive presumption applies only to convictions, collateral estoppel was inapplicable because the criminal court did not necessarily decide intent to kill, and genuine factual disputes remained about intent/unjustifiability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff (Ivy) Argument | Defendant (Faskowitz) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an NGRI adjudication is equivalent to a conviction under the Slayer Statute | NGRI effectively establishes the elements of first‑degree murder, so the estate should be barred from paying benefits (collateral estoppel/per se bar) | Slayer Statute’s conclusive presumption applies only to convictions; NGRI is an acquittal and not the same as a conviction | Denied — statute’s plain language limits conclusive presumption to convictions only |
| Whether the criminal NGRI finding collaterally estops Faskowitz from litigating that he acted intentionally and unjustifiably | The criminal trial necessarily decided intent/unjustifiability, so collateral estoppel bars relitigation | The criminal court did not necessarily find intent to kill (could be intent to cause great bodily harm or knowledge of probability), so issues differ | Denied — threshold for collateral estoppel not met because prior adjudication did not actually and necessarily determine intent to kill or unjustifiability |
| Whether statements to experts and responses to requests to admit are judicial admissions establishing intent/unjustifiability as a matter of law | Expert testimony about Faskowitz’s admissions and his own admissions to discovery are binding judicial admissions showing intent/unjustifiability | Statements to experts are hearsay/evidentiary admissions and not unequivocal judicial admissions; the limited admissions do not resolve intent or justification | Denied — doctor testimony not judicial admissions; two admissions (stabbing, location) do not resolve intent/unjustifiability |
| Whether summary judgment was proper to disqualify Faskowitz under the Slayer Statute | Even if collateral estoppel fails, the undisputed record establishes intentional, unjustifiable killing as a matter of law | Material factual disputes (insanity, perceptions, possible belief in self‑defense, and uncertainty as to intent to kill) preclude summary judgment | Denied — genuine issues of material fact remain; summary judgment inappropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378 (Ill. 2000) (criminal conviction can collaterally estop a defendant on issues determined at trial)
- In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92 (Ill. 2008) (standard of review for collateral estoppel applicability)
- Du Page Forklift Serv., Inc. v. Material Handling Servs., Inc., 195 Ill. 2d 71 (Ill. 2001) (purpose and scope of collateral estoppel)
- Talarico v. Dunlap, 281 Ill. App. 3d 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (threshold requirements for collateral estoppel)
- Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 173 Ill. 2d 447 (Ill. 1996) (collateral estoppel must be narrowly tailored to issues actually decided)
- People v. Harris, 72 Ill. 2d 16 (Ill. 1978) (distinguishing intent to kill from intent to cause great bodily harm)
- People v. Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d 1 (Ill. 2004) (intent distinctions in murder/related offenses)