In re Estate of Heater
2021 UT 66
| Utah | 2021Background
- John Clifford Heater died intestate in 2008; his children Gina Mallough Kirkland and Garret Heater served as co-personal representatives of the estate.
- John Carlon (born to Myrol, who was married to Thomas Carlon at the time) moved to intervene claiming Heater was his biological father; DNA testing showed Carlon and Garret are half-siblings, establishing Heater as Carlon’s genetic father.
- The district court granted summary judgment finding Heater was Carlon’s biological father and named Kirkland, Garret, and Carlon as heirs, stating no further proceedings were necessary; Kirkland appealed; the court of appeals affirmed; Kirkland sought certiorari.
- Kirkland argued (1) the Probate Code requires parentage be determined under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (so Thomas, the presumed husband, is Carlon’s father and that presumption could not now be rebutted), and (2) the Probate Code forbids a child from inheriting from two fathers.
- The Supreme Court (1) clarified appellate finality in probate (disavowing the prior pragmatic finality test but reached the merits prospectively), and (2) affirmed that Carlon established a parent-child relationship with Heater both under the Probate Code and, alternatively, under the Parentage Act; the one-set-of-parents rule cited by Kirkland applies only to adoptions and did not bar Carlon’s succession.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Kirkland) | Defendant's Argument (Carlon) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appellate jurisdiction/finality of probate order | The district court’s "no further proceedings necessary" order was final under a pragmatic probate finality test, so appeal was proper | The appeal was taken under precedent allowing pragmatic finality; parties relied on that precedent | Court disavowed pragmatic finality; nonfinal probate orders are appealable only via rules/statutes (Rule 5, Rule 54(b), or statutory exceptions); granted review prospectively and reached merits anyway |
| Whether §75-2-114(1) requires parentage only via Parentage Act | §114(1) incorporates Parentage Act, so parentage in probate must be established under that Act | §114(1) is permissive; Probate Code defines "natural parent" independently and also allows Parentage Act methods | §114(1) stands on its own; parentage for intestate succession may be shown under Probate Code’s definition or by using Parentage Act procedures (Parentage Act is optional) |
| Whether Thomas’s presumption of paternity is irrefutable because he is deceased (joinder provision) | Joinder provision of Parentage Act prevents rebuttal of a presumed father who cannot be joined (Thomas is dead) | Parentage Act permits rebuttal via genetic testing (§607) and contains provisions acknowledging actions involving deceased persons and estates | Genetic testing rebutted the presumption in the manner prescribed by the Parentage Act; Thomas’s death and joinder provision did not bar adjudication here |
| Whether the Probate Code prohibits inheriting from two fathers (one-set-of-parents rule) | A child who had a presumed father at the time of that father’s death cannot later inherit from another biological father; Probate Code prohibits dual succession | The one-set-of-parents rule in §75-2-114(2) applies only to adopted children; no statute bars biological succession from Heater here | The one-set-of-parents rule is limited to adoption contexts (§114(2)); it does not bar Carlon from inheriting from Heater |
Key Cases Cited
- WDIS, LLC v. Hi-Country Ests. Homeowners Ass’n, 449 P.3d 171 (Utah 2019) (final-judgment rule; an appeal is improper from nonfinal orders absent statutory or procedural avenues)
- Kelly v. West One Trust Co. (In re Est. of Morrison), 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (articulated a pragmatic probate finality approach relied upon by the parties)
- State v. Marquina, 478 P.3d 37 (Utah 2020) (standard of review on certiorari: review for correctness of court-of-appeals legal conclusions)
- Gillett v. Price, 135 P.3d 861 (Utah 2006) (rules govern available relief; prior contrary precedent abrogated where rules control)
- Hill v. Nakai (In re Est. of Hannifin), 311 P.3d 1016 (Utah 2013) (interpreting §75-2-114(2) as creating a one-set-of-parents rule in adoption contexts)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (uses the term “natural parent” to refer to biological parents in the context of parental-rights due-process analysis)