In re Estate of Gadash, 2017 COA 54

Paul and Lorella (Mrs.) Gadash executed three marital agreements: a 1975 antenuptial agreement, a 1978 second marital agreement (in which Lorella waived an elective share of Paul’s estate), and a 2001 third marital agreement that incorporated the first agreement and limited its scope to properties in attached exhibits but did not reference the second agreement.
Paul’s 2008 will left most probate assets to his daughter and only $2,000 to Lorella; Paul died December 31, 2014 and his will was probated under unsupervised administration.
On March 4, 2015 Lorella filed (a) a petition for a spouse’s elective share under §15-11-202 and (b) a separate creditor’s claim seeking compensation for end-of-life care she provided to Paul.
The probate court barred Lorella’s creditor’s claim for failure to timely protest disallowance (order entered September 24, 2015) and later denied her elective-share petition (order entered January 19, 2016).
Lorella appealed both rulings on March 4, 2016. The Court of Appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction to review the creditor-claim order because that order was final and not timely appealed, but reviewed the elective-share ruling on the merits.
On the merits, the court held the 2001 third marital agreement did not supersede or void the 1978 second marital agreement because it contained no integration/merger clause and addressed distinct property.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the probate court’s order barring Lorella’s creditor’s claim was a final appealable order and timely appealed	Lorella: the creditor-claim order was not final until the court ruled on her alternative elective-share petition, so her March 2016 appeal was timely	PR (estate’s rep): the creditor claim initiated an independent proceeding; the order disposing of that claim was final and the appeal was untimely	Held: The creditor-claim proceeding was independent; the order was final and Lorella’s appeal as to that order is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Whether the 2001 third marital agreement superseded or voided the 1978 second marital agreement (affecting Lorella’s elective-share rights)	Lorella: the third agreement contained a merger/integration clause or otherwise impliedly revoked the second agreement, so she should be entitled to elect an elective share	PR: the third agreement limited its scope to listed properties, did not contain an integration clause, and did not conflict with the second agreement	Held: Third agreement did not integrate/supersede the second; the probate court properly considered the second marital agreement in denying Lorella’s elective-share petition

Scott v. Scott, 136 P.3d 892 (Colo. 2006) (explains when a probate court order is final and how petitions define independent probate proceedings)
In re Estate of Scott, 151 P.3d 642 (Colo. App. 2006) (applies Scott to probate proceedings and related petitions)
Luster v. Brinkman, 250 P.3d 664 (Colo. App. 2010) (directs courts to examine the legal effect of an order to determine finality)
In re Marriage of Farr, 228 P.3d 267 (Colo. App. 2010) (timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional)