2022 IL App (2d) 210053
Ill. App. Ct.2022Background
- Decedent Mark A. Coffman (d. Apr. 26, 2018) executed a 2001 will naming his wife Dorothy primary beneficiary and creating trusts that preserved certain family-business interests for his sisters (petitioners Peggy LeMaster and Kathleen Martinez) after Dorothy’s death.
- Mark was diagnosed with metastatic cancer in 2016; by March 2018 he was hospitalized, had episodes of delirium but medical notes also recorded periods when he was alert and oriented.
- On March 16–17, 2018 Dorothy (who had been appointed Mark’s agent under a 2001 statutory power of attorney) contacted attorney John Hynds; Hynds met Mark at the hospital on March 17 and Mark executed a new 2018 will in Hynds’s presence (witnessed by Hynds’s assistant Lisa Barkley) that changed ultimate disposition of family-business interests to give Dorothy greater control.
- Petitioners filed a will-contest arguing Dorothy exerted undue influence to procure the 2018 will; at the close of petitioners’ case the trial court granted Dorothy’s motion for a directed finding, concluding petitioners had not made a prima facie showing of actual or presumptive undue influence.
- On appeal petitioners argued the court erred in refusing to apply (1) the fiduciary-based presumption of undue influence (because Dorothy was Mark’s agent under a power of attorney and allegedly procured the will), and (2) an alternative presumption applicable when the chief beneficiary procures the will of a debilitated testator.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dorothy’s appointment as agent under a statutory power of attorney created a fiduciary relationship that invokes the presumption of undue influence | Petitioners: Dorothy was Mark’s statutory agent for property and thus a fiduciary as a matter of law, so the presumption should apply | Dorothy: She had not accepted/exercised the property POA powers prior to the will and the POA expressly disclaims power to make or change a will; no fiduciary duty over estate planning arose | Court: No prima facie fiduciary relationship for purposes of the presumption because Dorothy had not exercised the property POA before the will and POA cannot be used to make/change a will |
| Whether Dorothy was “instrumental” in procuring the 2018 will (fourth element of the presumption) | Petitioners: Dorothy initiated contact with counsel and participated in events surrounding the will, so she procured or participated in procurement | Dorothy: Hynds and Mark drove the process; testimony showed Mark directed decisions, read and discussed the will, and chose the trust option over Dorothy’s initial preference | Court: Trial court’s finding that Dorothy did not procure the will was not against manifest weight — evidence showed Mark was engaged, directed decisions, and overruled Dorothy on key points |
| Whether an alternative presumption arises when the chief beneficiary procures a will of a debilitated testator (independent of a fiduciary relationship) | Petitioners: Courts recognize a presumption where the chief beneficiary actively procures a will when the testator is debilitated | Dorothy: That line of authority was repudiated by later precedent; here medical evidence did not establish debilitating incapacity at execution | Court: Rejected petitioner’s reliance on the debilitated-testator presumption (Belfield repudiated the non-fiduciary presumption) and found record did not show Mark was so debilitated that a presumption would apply |
Key Cases Cited
- Kokinis v. Kotrich, 81 Ill. 2d 151 (establishes standard for directed finding)
- Minch v. George, 395 Ill. App. 3d 390 (two-step analysis for ruling on a section 2-1110 directed-finding motion)
- In re Estate of Kline, 245 Ill. App. 3d 413 (elements of undue-influence presumption)
- In re Estate of Maher, 237 Ill. App. 3d 1013 (presumptive undue influence where fiduciary relationship and participation alleged)
- Swenson v. Wintercorn, 92 Ill. App. 2d 88 (instrumental/participation factor in procurement inquiry)
- Mitchell v. Van Scoyk, 1 Ill. 2d 160 (original formulation suggesting a debilitated-testator presumption)
- Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill. 2d 293 (repudiates idea that a presumption arises absent a fiduciary relationship)
- Nemeth v. Banhalmi, 125 Ill. App. 3d 938 (prima facie requirement: plaintiff must present some evidence on every essential element)
- In re Estate of Lemke, 203 Ill. App. 3d 999 (procurement/participation insufficient where testator stated own wishes to attorney)