In re Estate of Amet Chelo, 209 A.3d 1181

Appellant Amet Chelo (93) was the subject of a guardianship proceeding initiated by his sons; a DMAT and guardian ad litem report found moderate dementia and recommended limited guardianship for certain matters.
On December 15, 2015, the Probate Court entered an order appointing Bruce D. Sawyer as "Limited Guardian" and directing Sawyer to consult with Chelo on major decisions; a contemporaneous certificate of appointment, however, vested Sawyer with "all the power and authority prescribed by law" and did not state the appointment was limited.
On December 18, 2015, the Probate Court entered a subsequent order appointing Sawyer simply as "Guardian of the person and estate" and setting visitation terms; that order contained no limiting language.
In March 2017 the Probate Court ordered Sawyer to arrange temporary placement of Chelo in an assisted-living facility; Chelo opposed removal and, through Sawyer, retained counsel and filed a Superior Court appeal of the placement order.
Appellees moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the December 18, 2015 order and the certificate of appointment established a full guardianship and therefore Chelo lacked capacity to prosecute an appeal in his own name.
The Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss; this appeal challenges that dismissal on the ground that Chelo remained under a limited guardianship and retained capacity to sue in his own name.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Chelo was under a limited guardianship (thus able to prosecute an appeal in his own name) or under a full guardianship (lacking capacity to sue on his own)	Chelo: the December 15, 2015 limited-guardianship order controlled; he retained capacity to retain counsel and appeal.	Appellees: the December 18, 2015 order and the certificate of appointment superseded the earlier limited order and created a full guardianship, so Chelo lacks capacity to sue in his own name.	The Court held the certificate and December 18 order established a full guardianship; the December 15 order and its limiting language were ineffective because the certificate and later order did not comply with statutory requirements for a limited guardianship. Therefore Chelo lacked capacity and the appeal dismissal was affirmed.

Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68 (R.I. 2001) (standard of review for statutory interpretation).
D'Amico v. Johnston Partners, 866 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 2005) (court examines statutory scheme and context when interpreting statutes).
Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223 (R.I. 1996) (mandatory meaning of "shall").
Castelli v. Carcieri, 961 A.2d 277 (R.I. 2008) ("shall" contemplates imposition of a duty).
In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147 (R.I. 2006) (statutes construed in context of the statutory scheme).
Champlin v. Probate Court of Exeter, 92 A. 982 (R.I. 1915) (when a guardian is appointed, actions for the ward should be brought by the guardian in the ward's name).
Taylor v. Superior Court, 74 A. 482 (R.I. 1909) (suit must be brought by the guardian in the name of the ward).