in Re Eric L. Thomas
09-16-00138-CV
| Tex. App. | Aug 25, 2016Background
- Relator Eric L. Thomas was found to be a sexually violent predator and in Jan. 2014 agreed to an Agreed Final Judgment and Agreed Order of Commitment providing for outpatient treatment supervised by the Office of Violent Sex Offender Management (OVSOM).
- The Agreed Order required residence in OVSOM-supervised housing and participation in OVSOM-provided treatment; it did not expressly bar future modification.
- In 2015 the Texas Legislature amended the SVP statute, transferring supervisory authority to the Texas Civil Commitment Office (TCCO) and requiring certain commitments to be modified to conform to the new law effective June 17, 2015.
- Based on the 2015 statutory changes, the trial court in Oct. 2015 amended Thomas’s commitment: TCCO to supervise, Thomas to reside where instructed by TCCO, and to participate in TCCO’s tiered (centralized) treatment program.
- Thomas sought mandamus relief, arguing the amendment (1) denied his statutory right to outpatient treatment, (2) violated his federal and state due process rights by altering a consent judgment, and (3) breached the Agreed Final Judgment treated as a binding contract.
- The court of appeals denied mandamus, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in amending the commitment to conform to the 2015 statutory amendments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court denied Thomas’s statutory right to outpatient treatment by ordering participation in a tiered/centralized program | Thomas: amendment removed outpatient treatment guaranteed by the Agreed Order | State: statute and amended order conform commitments to new statutory framework; TCCO may set program/location | Court: no abuse of discretion; statute required modification and Thomas had no settled right to a particular location/type of treatment |
| Whether amending the Agreed Final Judgment violated constitutional due process / was an impermissible modification of a consent judgment | Thomas: consent judgment is a contract; court could not alter its terms after entry without violating due process | State: agreed judgments have ordinary force but Health & Safety Code authorized court to modify commitments after notice and hearing; no express prohibition on amendment | Court: consent judgment did not bar modification; statute (§841.082(e)) allowed post-judgment modifications; no due process violation |
| Whether 2015 statutory amendments applied retroactively to commitments entered before June 17, 2015 | Thomas: retroactive application upsets settled expectations and violates due process | State: subsection 40(b) and legislative intent require previously imposed requirements be modified to conform; retroactive application constitutionally permissible here | Court: amendments could be applied to Thomas without violating due process; modification required by statute |
Key Cases Cited
- Wagner v. Warnasch, 295 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1956) (consent judgments have same effect as other judgments)
- Gracia v. RC Cola-7-Up Bottling Co., 667 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1984) (agreed judgments construed like contracts)
- R & P Enters. v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1980) (construe entire instrument so provisions are not meaningless)
- Gulf Ins. Co. v. Burns Motors, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. 2000) (analysis of agreed-judgment effect and contract principles)
- Henderson v. Shanks, 449 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014) (documents referencing other writings are construed together)
- Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Associates, 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (mandamus abuse-of-discretion standards)
- Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (standards for mandamus review)