575 B.R. 616
Bankr. D. Del.2017Background
- Debtors (EFH/EFIH) entered a Merger Agreement with NextEra (July 29, 2016) that included a $275 million termination (break-up) fee payable to NextEra under specified circumstances.
- Debtors sought and the Bankruptcy Court approved the Merger Agreement and Termination Fee on September 19, 2016; the record regarding exactly when the fee would be payable was confusing and incomplete.
- Key ambiguity: the Merger Agreement contained no regulatory-approval deadline and, if the Texas Public Utility Commission (PUCT) denied approval, the fee could become payable if the Debtors (not NextEra) later terminated to pursue an alternative transaction.
- PUCT ultimately denied NextEra’s change-of-control application after hearings and rehearing requests (April–June 2017); NextEra did not terminate the merger but pursued appeals, forcing the Debtors to terminate the agreement on July 7, 2017 and enter a deal with another party.
- Elliott moved to reconsider the Court’s September 19, 2016 order approving the Termination Fee, arguing the Court misapprehended critical facts and therefore misapplied the governing Third Circuit O’Brien standard; the Court granted reconsideration.
Issues
| Issue | Elliott (movant) argument | Debtors/NextEra argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Termination Fee Order is interlocutory or final | Order is interlocutory because allocation and entitlement issues remained; rights unsettled | NextEra argued reliance and finality should preclude reconsideration | Interlocutory — court treated order as interlocutory (flexible bankruptcy finality) and reconsideration permissible |
| Whether the Court misapprehended material facts at approval hearing | Court misunderstood when fee would be payable; record was confusing and parties failed to disclose that NextEra had incentive to wait, forcing Debtors to terminate and trigger fee | Debtors/NextEra relied on record statements that NextEra would not seek fee if NextEra terminated; argued parties relied on order | Court found a manifest misapprehension of fact: record was confusing and court overlooked that Debtors-initiated termination after PUCT denial would trigger fee |
| Whether the Termination Fee satisfied O’Brien (actual benefit to estate) | Fee could be payable even if PUCT denied approval and transaction failed — such payment would not provide an actual benefit to the estate and therefore fails O’Brien | Debtors argued fee was market, induced NextEra bid, and unlikely to be triggered | Court held fee could not meet O’Brien because it could be payable where no actual benefit to estate existed (e.g., after regulatory denial and debtor termination) — approval was legal error |
| Whether reconsideration is warranted despite passage of time and reliance | Reconsideration needed to prevent manifest injustice and correct clear error of law/fact | NextEra emphasized reliance and costs incurred pursuing approvals | Court concluded interests of justice outweigh finality; granted motion to reconsider and directed proposed orders |
Key Cases Cited
- In re O'Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 1999) (establishes that a termination fee must provide an actual benefit to the estate to be allowed as an administrative expense)
- In re Reliant Energy Channelview L.P., 594 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2010) (termination-fee approval discussed in post-O'Brien context)
- Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686 (2015) (bankruptcy orders may remain interlocutory under a pragmatic finality analysis)
- Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669 (3d Cir. 1999) (standards for granting reconsideration; manifest injustice/clear error)
- Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906 (3d Cir. 1985) (grounds for relief and standards relating to finality and reconsideration)
- In re Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d 950 (1st Cir. 1976) (administrative priority requires that the estate actually benefited)
- Calyon N.Y. Branch v. Am. Home Mortg. Corp., 383 B.R. 585 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (applying Rule 59(e) standard to reconsideration of interlocutory bankruptcy orders)
