In re Elijah C., 165 A.3d 1149

Background

Mother (Marquita C.) has severe cognitive deficits and psychiatric conditions; child Elijah was removed shortly after birth and adjudicated neglected on predictive neglect grounds.
Trial court ordered reunification services and specific steps; later allowed limited additional time for services but ultimately terminated mother’s parental rights after finding DCF made reasonable efforts and mother was unable to benefit from them.
Two court-ordered psychological evaluations found mother in the extremely low IQ range with adaptive functioning comparable to young children, ongoing hallucinations, and risk that she could not be left alone with children without 24-hour supervision.
Mother argued on appeal that DCF reduced and substituted visitation/supervision providers (eliminating an agency trained to work with cognitive disabilities) contrary to a prior court order, undermining the reasonableness of reunification efforts and the finding she could not benefit.
Appellate Court dismissed the appeal as moot for inadequate briefing of the inability-to-benefit finding; the Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification, vacated that judgment, but affirmed termination on the independent ground that the evidence supported the finding mother could not benefit from reunification.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Mother)	Defendant's Argument (DCF)	Held
Was the Appellate Court correct to dismiss appeal as moot for inadequate briefing of mother’s challenge to finding she was unable to benefit?	Briefing was sufficient to raise the claim tied to DCF’s reduced services; the claims were interrelated.	Mother’s briefing was minimal and failed to challenge the alternative basis for judgment, so appeal is moot.	Appellate Court erred; mother’s challenge was reasonably discernible and not inadequately briefed.
Did trial court clearly err in finding mother unable to benefit from reunification services?	Reduction/substitution of supervised-visit services deprived mother of crucial supports; DCF could have done more to locate appropriate services.	Psychological evaluations and hospitalization showed severe, enduring deficits; no in-state program provided required 24/7 supervision; evidence supports inability-to-benefit regardless of service changes.	Affirmed: evidence (two expert evaluations, recent hospitalization, lack of appropriate programs) supports finding mother could not benefit from reunification.
Did DCF’s substitution/removal of services render reunification efforts unreasonable (including ADA considerations)?	DCF’s change in providers and reduction in visits undermined reasonableness and compliance with ADA accommodations.	No evidence the change harmed outcomes; mother did not identify available alternative services; ADA is not a defense to TPR.	Court did not reach merits of ADA challenge; noted ADA and state anti-discrimination law inform what reasonable accommodations DCF must consider but mother did not preserve out-of-state-placement claim and cited no authority requiring 24/7 services.
Does the ADA provide a defense in termination proceedings or otherwise affect reasonable-efforts analysis?	ADA protections should require DCF to provide accommodations and could affect reasonableness of efforts.	ADA is not a defense to termination; but it informs obligations of agencies to make reasonable accommodations in services.	ADA cannot be used as a defense to TPR, but its requirements (and state law incorporation) guide what reasonable reunification efforts and accommodations the agency must make.

Key Cases Cited

In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539 (court explained § 17a-112(j)(1) requires either reasonable efforts or a finding parent cannot benefit; unchallenged alternative finding can render appeal moot)
In re Gabriella A., 319 Conn. 775 (standard of review and weight accorded to professional testimony in termination proceedings)
In re Joseph W., 305 Conn. 633 (ADA is not a defense in neglect or termination proceedings; distinction between agency services and court proceedings)
In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485 (statutory criteria for termination must be strictly complied with; framework for adjudicatory and dispositional phases)
In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569 (courts may give great weight to professional opinions in parental termination cases)