229 So. 3d 36
La. Ct. App.2017Background
- The Eleanor Pierce (Marshall) Stevens Living Trust was created in 1979; Finley Hilliard served as trustee and was removed in 2013; Preston Marshall became co-trustee/Trust Protector.
- July 22, 2013 judgment ordered Hilliard to collect and deliver broad categories of "Trust Records" (including third-party law firm files) to successor trustees, with in camera submission and privilege logs if privilege claimed.
- Hilliard produced large volumes of documents (tens of thousands of pages) and extensive privilege/ownership logs but third parties (law firms, estate representatives) asserted ownership or privilege over many items.
- Preston filed a Rule for Contempt (May 2014) alleging Hilliard failed to comply, seeking contempt sanctions, attorney fees, and a declaration of entitlement to files; lengthy hearings followed.
- Hilliard moved to recuse Judge Canaday based on alleged ex parte contacts; the recusal motion was referred, heard by another judge, and denied; that denial was affirmed on appeal.
- The trial court found Hilliard in contempt, ordered compliance, and awarded costs and attorneys’ fees; on appeal the court reversed the contempt and motion-to-compel rulings but affirmed denial of recusal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial judge should be recused for alleged ex parte contacts/bias | Preston: contacts were minor and did not show disqualifying bias (implicitly defended judge) | Hilliard: undisclosed ex parte communications and implied bias required recusal under Canon 3(C)/Art.151 | Denial of recusal affirmed; no showing of actual, substantial bias under art.151(A)(4) and no palpable error |
| Whether the contempt finding was civil or criminal and applicable burden of proof | Preston: sought contempt and fees; proceeded as civil contempt | Hilliard: trial court applied civil standard but judgment operated punitively, requiring criminal contempt protections | Court held the judgment was punitive in effect (criminal contempt) and trial court erred by applying civil (preponderance) standard |
| Whether Hilliard willfully disobeyed the July 22, 2013 order (constructive contempt) | Preston: Hilliard failed to deliver certain firm files (e.g., Hunter) and thus wilfully disobeyed | Hilliard: he produced massive material and complied as to items he controlled; third-party privileges and ownerships prevented further turnover; judgment was ambiguous | On de novo review, reversal of contempt: Trust failed to prove intentional, knowing, purposeful disobedience without justifiable excuse given ambiguity and contested ownership/privilege issues |
| Whether the trial court properly granted a motion to compel production from Hilliard | Preston: motion to compel was proper to obtain Trust records and enforce turnover | Hilliard: production obligations complicated by third-party claims and ambiguity in order; contempt was not appropriate enforcement mechanism | Motion to compel reversed — production disputes involving third-party ownership/privilege require separate resolution; contempt was improper remedy |
Key Cases Cited
- In re: Eleanor Pierce (Marshall) Stevens Living Trust, 159 So.3d 1101 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2015) (prior appellate history concerning trustee removals and trust administration)
- Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp., 66 So.3d 438 (La. 2011) (law-of-the-case doctrine and standards for reconsideration)
- Folse v. Transocean Offshore USA, Inc., 872 So.2d 467 (La. 2004) (Supreme Court reversal of denial of recusal; cited in discussion of judicial supervisory authority)
- Dauphine v. Carencro High Sch., 843 So.2d 1096 (La. 2003) (distinguishing civil vs. criminal contempt and applicable purposes)
- Lang v. Asten, Inc., 918 So.2d 453 (La. 2006) (willful disobedience requires intentional, knowing, purposeful violation without justifiable excuse)
- Slaughter v. Board of Sup’rs of Southern Univ., 76 So.3d 465 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2011) (Article 151 recusal grounds require actual bias of substantial nature)