In re Edwin A. Towne, Jr., 182 A.3d 1149

Background

Edwin A. Towne, Jr. was convicted of first-degree murder in 1989 and has filed numerous PCR petitions; this appeal concerns his 10th and 11th petitions.
Towne’s earlier PCR petitions repeatedly raised ineffective-assistance claims (failure to investigate alibi witnesses, failure to appeal, conflicts of interest) and were dismissed as successive or otherwise precluded.
In 2012 (PCR 2013-191) Towne sought appointment of counsel and argued Martinez v. Ryan could excuse procedural bars because his initial PCR counsel was ineffective. The State moved to dismiss as successive/abuse of the writ/not cognizable.
The PCR court dismissed PCR 2013-191 and PCR 2015-382 as successive or an abuse of the writ, and held standalone claims of ineffective assistance of prior PCR counsel were outside the scope of the PCR statute.
On appeal Towne contends the court prematurely treated his counsel-appointment filing as a PCR petition, failed to notify him of the State’s motion, and renews claims: trial counsel’s failure to secure alibi witnesses, appellate counsel conflict, and disqualification of a PCR judge.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Towne)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether Towne’s claims are barred as successive where they were previously adjudicated on the merits	Earlier PCR counsel’s ineffectiveness (Martinez) excuses successive-petition rule and warrants relitigation	§7134 bars relitigation of claims already decided on the merits; Towne has not shown cause/prejudice	Claims are successive and barred; relief denied
Whether Martinez v. Ryan should be adopted by Vermont to excuse procedural defaults caused by ineffective initial PCR counsel	Vermont should adopt Martinez to allow review of trial-ineffectiveness claims that prior PCR counsel failed to raise	Martinez is a federal equitable rule; even if adopted, Towne cannot show prejudice or substantive merit	Court declines to adopt Martinez for resolution but rules that, even under Martinez, Towne’s claims fail for lack of prejudice/merit
Whether trial counsel’s failure to locate/present alleged alibi witnesses was prejudicial (Strickland prejudice)	Had counsel investigated/presented those witnesses, the verdict/sentence would likely differ	Towne offers only speculation, no affidavits or evidence that witnesses would exculpate him	No Strickland prejudice shown; claim fails and is barred as successive/abuse
Whether appellate counsel had a conflict of interest that prejudiced the appeal	Trial counsel’s subsequent PCR claims created a conflict during the direct appeal that undermined appellate representation	Records show other attorneys authored and argued the appeal; Towne has not shown conflict-caused prejudice	Claim lacks merit and prejudice; dismissal for abuse of the writ affirmed

Key Cases Cited

State v. Towne, 158 Vt. 607, 615 A.2d 484 (Vt. 1992) (describing underlying criminal conviction)
In re Towne, 182 Vt. 614, 938 A.2d 1205 (Vt. 2007) (affirming dismissal of successive PCR claims)
In re Laws, 182 Vt. 66, 928 A.2d 1210 (Vt. 2007) (discussing successive petitions and abuse-of-the-writ framework)
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1963) (three‑part "ends of justice" test for successive writs)
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (U.S. 1991) (cause-and-prejudice test for procedural default)
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2012) (federal rule allowing ineffective‑PCR‑counsel to establish cause for default of trial-ineffectiveness claims)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims)