In Re E.C.
E2016-02582-COA-R3-PT
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Jun 6, 2017Background
- Child born Feb 2015; mother surrendered parental rights. Father (Michael B.) had prior methamphetamine-related convictions and was on probation; he violated probation, absconded, and was re-incarcerated in July 2015 and later sentenced to serve nine years (release date projected 2023).
- DCS removed the child to foster care Aug 2015; DNA confirmed paternity Dec 2015, but an order establishing paternity was not entered until Aug 2016.
- DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights on June 29, 2016; bench trial occurred Nov 22, 2016 (Father participated by telephone).
- Trial court terminated Father’s rights on four grounds: (1) failure to manifest ability/willingness to assume custody; (2) placing child with Father would risk substantial harm; (3) failure to establish/exercise paternity; and (4) abandonment by wanton disregard; it also found termination was in the child’s best interest.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed termination for (1) failure to manifest willingness/ability and (3) failure to establish paternity, reversed as to (2) substantial-harm risk and (4) abandonment by wanton disregard, and affirmed the trial court’s best-interest determination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (DCS) | Defendant's Argument (Father) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to manifest ability/willingness to assume custody (Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv)) | Father’s conduct (absconding, probation violations leading to incarceration) shows he did not manifest ability/willingness to assume custody. | Father claimed willingness and plans for housing/employment on release; visited and provided for child while briefly on house arrest. | Affirmed — Father’s course of conduct (failure to report, re-incarceration) supports termination. |
| Placing child with Father would pose substantial risk of physical/psychological harm (§36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(v)) | Father’s incarceration and lack of relationship with child would likely harm the child if custody returned. | Mere incarceration alone does not establish substantial risk; no evidence of harm during Father’s visitation; child thriving in foster care is not proof Father would cause harm. | Reversed — incarceration alone, without more evidence of likely substantial harm, is insufficient. |
| Failure to establish paternity (§36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(vi)) | Father knew of paternity but failed to file a petition to establish paternity within the statutory period. | DCS did not reasonably assist Father in establishing paternity; procedural delays harmed Father. | Affirmed — Father had opportunity (was out ~35 days) and failed to file; DCS’s assistance is considered in best-interest analysis, not as prerequisite. |
| Abandonment by wanton disregard (Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-102(1)(A)(iv)) | Father’s criminal history, probation violations, and absconding exhibit wanton disregard for the child’s welfare. | Many offenses predated conception; post-conception conduct (single probation violation) does not show unrestrainedly excessive disregard; Father provided care while briefly released. | Reversed — court erred considering pre-conception conduct; post-conception record did not show wanton disregard by clear and convincing evidence. |
| Best interest of the child | Termination serves child’s stability; child bonded with foster family; Father incarcerated for the child’s formative years. | Father loves child and visited/provided while briefly released; argues potential for rehabilitation on release. | Affirmed — weighing statutory factors, clear and convincing evidence supports that termination is in child’s best interest. |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (parental rights are a fundamental liberty interest)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (termination requires heightened standard of proof)
- In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240 (Tenn. 2010) (parental rights are constitutionally protected but not absolute)
- In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507 (Tenn. 2016) (appellate review obligations in termination cases; consider grounds found by trial court)
- In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533 (Tenn. 2015) (DCS reasonable-effort requirement generally evaluated in best-interest analysis)
- Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (definition and evidentiary scope of "substantial harm")