In re: Douglas Coley
871 F.3d 455
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Douglas Coley was convicted in 1998 of multiple crimes including three counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death under Ohio’s capital-sentencing scheme (judge imposed after a jury recommendation).
- Coley filed a federal habeas petition in 2003; the district court denied it and this court affirmed in Coley v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741 (6th Cir. 2013).
- In 2017 Coley sought to file a new § 2254 petition based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida (2016), arguing Ohio’s scheme is unconstitutional because the jury did not make specific findings required by Hurst.
- The district court transferred the 2017 filing to the Sixth Circuit for authorization as a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
- The majority held Coley cannot satisfy § 2244(b)’s requirements (including retroactivity under § 2244(b)(2)(A)) and denied authorization to file; they also rejected Coley’s claim that the petition is not “second or successive.”
- Judge Merritt dissented, arguing Coley made a prima facie showing under § 2244(b)(3)(C) that the factual predicate (that a judge, not a jury, made the final sentencing decision) could not have been discovered earlier and would authorize the district court to consider the petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Coley may file a second-in-time § 2254 petition based on Hurst | Hurst announced a new rule making Ohio’s judge-led sentencing unconstitutional; petition is not "second or successive" because Hurst did not exist at first filing | § 2244(b) bars second or successive petitions unless statutory exceptions apply; Hurst has not been made retroactive on collateral review | Denied: petition is second or successive and Coley failed to meet § 2244(b)(2)(A) retroactivity requirement; authorization to file denied |
| Whether a second-in-time petition relying on a new rule is exempt from § 2244(b) as not "second or successive" | The new-rule basis (Hurst) means the claim was not available at first petition and thus isn’t successive | The not-successive exception is limited (ripeness or prior dismissal for mixed petitions); allowing Coley’s approach would nullify § 2244(b) | Denied: exception doesn’t cover all new legal rules; § 2244(b)(2)(A) governs such claims |
| Whether a new legal rule can be treated as a new factual predicate under § 2244(b)(2)(B) | Hurst’s overruling of prior law means the judge-vs-jury fact is a newly cognizable predicate | New rules are legal, not factual; treating them as factual would render (b)(2)(A) superfluous | Denied: new legal rule ≠ new factual predicate; Coley didn’t satisfy (b)(2)(B)’s clear-and-convincing requirement |
| Whether applying § 2244(b) here suspends the writ of habeas corpus | Coley contends enforcement here effectively suspends the writ | Precedent holds restrictions on successive petitions do not suspend the writ | Denied: enforcing successive-petition restrictions does not suspend the writ |
Key Cases Cited
- Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (explains limits on when a later petition is not "second or successive")
- Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998) (ripeness exception where claim was not adjudicated earlier)
- Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (effect of mixed petitions and abuse-of-the-writ concerns)
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (second-or-successive rules’ statutory purpose and limits)
- Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001) (Supreme Court must make a rule retroactive for § 2244(b)(2)(A) relief)
- Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (holding restrictions on successive petitions do not suspend the writ)
- Coley v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741 (6th Cir. 2013) (prior Sixth Circuit decision denying Coley’s earlier habeas petition)