In re Dorrance Dickens & In re Deborah Luxenberg
16-BG-762
| D.C. | Dec 7, 2017Background
- Deborah Luxenberg was the majority partner (52%) of a small firm; Dorrance Dickens rose from law clerk to partner and handled trust/estate work for client Michelle Seltzer.
- Luxenberg agreed to be co‑trustee of Seltzer’s 1990 trust and introduced Dickens to Seltzer for estate work in 2004 and 2009; Dickens created a separate 2009 trust and handled most interactions thereafter.
- Dickens repeatedly missed deadlines, failed to keep firm files, traveled extensively, and ultimately misappropriated over $1.4 million from Seltzer’s estates and trusts; he fled and did not participate in the disciplinary proceedings.
- The Board found Dickens’ conduct warranted disbarment; it found Luxenberg violated Rules 1.3(a), 5.1(a), and 5.1(c)(2) for lack of diligence and inadequate supervision, and recommended a six‑month suspension.
- Luxenberg challenged the Board’s use of evidence, the Rule 1.3 findings, and the severity of sanction; Disciplinary Counsel sought additional rule violations and a one‑year suspension with fitness.
- The D.C. Court of Appeals accepted the Board’s findings as supported by substantial evidence, rejected additional charges against Luxenberg (Rules 1.3(b), 1.7(b)(4), 8.4(a)), and imposed a six‑month suspension without fitness, effective 30 days after the opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Disciplinary Counsel's Argument | Luxenberg's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Luxenberg violated Rule 1.3 (diligence) and Rule 1.3(b) (intentional neglect/prejudice) | Luxenberg neglected Seltzer’s matter and knowingly defaulted, warranting findings under 1.3(a) and 1.3(b)(1),(2) | She did not neglect duties; Board conflated 1.3(a) with 1.3(b); record doesn’t show intent | Court: Violated Rule 1.3(a) (lack of diligence); insufficient evidence to prove intentional violations under Rule 1.3(b) |
| Whether Luxenberg violated Rule 5.1(a) (partners must ensure firm compliance) and Rule 5.1(c)(2) (responsibility for subordinate misconduct) | As majority partner who set client assignments and had managerial authority, she failed to make reasonable efforts and reasonably should have known Dickens’ misconduct | She lacked sufficient managerial/supervisory authority for 5.1 liability; Rule 5.1 has been applied only where direct supervision existed | Court: Luxenberg had managerial authority and violated Rule 5.1(a); under objective "reasonably should have known" standard, she violated Rule 5.1(c)(2) by failing to act on warning signs |
| Whether Luxenberg violated Rule 1.7(b)(4) (conflict) and Rule 8.4(a) (assist/induce violations) | Her personal/friendship interests and deference to Dickens adversely affected representation; she knowingly assisted Dickens’ misconduct | No evidence her judgment was adversely affected or that she knowingly aided Dickens’ theft | Court: No violation of Rules 1.7(b)(4) or 8.4(a); record lacks substantial evidence of conflicted judgment or knowing assistance |
| Appropriate sanction for Luxenberg’s violations | Disciplinary Counsel: one‑year suspension with fitness; Board HC recommended 45 days; Board recommended six months | Luxenberg: reprimand or lighter sanction; Board’s 6‑month recommendation is excessive | Court: Adopts Board’s six‑month suspension (no fitness requirement), balancing seriousness, lack of intent, cooperation, reputation, and precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Downey, 162 A.3d 162 (D.C. 2017) (appellate standard for accepting Board fact findings)
- In re Samad, 51 A.3d 486 (D.C. 2012) (de novo review of ultimate facts and conclusions of law)
- In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1 (D.C. 2005) (sanction review and deference to Board recommendations)
- In re Lieber, 442 A.2d 153 (D.C. 1982) (criteria for existence of attorney–client relationship)
- In re Fay, 111 A.3d 1025 (D.C. 2015) (attorney obligations arise from fiduciary relationship; totality of circumstances test)
- In re Robinson, 74 A.3d 688 (D.C. 2013) (partner liability under Rule 5.1 for failing to ensure firm compliance after warning signs)
- In re Cohen, 847 A.2d 1162 (D.C. 2004) (interpretation of Rule 5.1(c)(2) and "reasonably should know" standard)
- In re Ukwu, 926 A.2d 1106 (D.C. 2007) (intent analysis for neglect ripening into Rule 1.3(b) violations)
- In re Anderson, 979 A.2d 1206 (D.C. 2009) (neglect ripening into intentional violation when lawyer is aware of neglect)
- In re Pelkey, 962 A.2d 268 (D.C. 2008) (factors for determining sanctions)
- In re Reback, 487 A.2d 235 (D.C. 1985) (definition of neglect in attorney discipline context)